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COMMENTS

MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES: WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE
LEGAL PROFESSION’S ETHICS RULES?

I. INTRODUCTION
“A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”1
The desire and demand to provide “one-stop shopping” has led to one of
the most important and controversial issues facing the legal profession today:
multidisciplinary practice (“MDP”).2 According to the Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice (“Commission”), an MDP is:
[A] partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity that
includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes the
delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that holds
itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services. It
includes an arrangement by which a law firm joins with one or more other
professional firms to provide services, including legal services, and there is a
direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of the arrangement.3

1. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Pmbl. (1983).
2. See ABA House of Delegates Calls for Additional Study of Multidisciplinary Practice,
PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 10, 1999 (Fin. News) (comment by William G. Paul); Robert M. Cearley,
Jr., President’s Report: Multidisciplinary Practice, 34 ARK. LAW. 2, 2 (1999); Stuart A.
Hoberman, The Law and More: Defining Multidisciplinary Practices, N.J. LAW., Apr. 19, 1999,
at 7.
3. Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (“MDP Comm’n”), Recommendation (visited
Sept.
23,
1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecommendation.html>
[hereinafter
Recommendation].
See also MDP Comm’n, Report (visited Sept. 23, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html> [hereinafter Report]; MDP Comm’n, Report App. A
(visited Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixa.html> [hereinafter App. A];
629
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The goal of the MDP is to provide “packaged services” to clients.4 “For
example a lawyer, a social worker, and a certified financial planner might form
an MDP to provide legal and nonlegal services in connection with counseling
older clients about estate planning, nursing home care and living wills.”5
In June 1999, the Commission recommended that the American Bar
Association (“ABA”)6 amend the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(“Model Rules”) to allow MDPs as defined by the Commission.7 If the
recommendation is adopted, it will possibly be implemented through a new
Model Rule.8

MDP Comm’n, Report App. C: Reporter’s Notes (visited Sept. 23, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixc.html> [hereinafter App. C]. Different commentators
define MDP differently. See, e.g., Steven C. Salch, Inter-Professional Practice Issues: A Debate
and Discussion, MAJOR TAX PLAN. ¶ 500, at 5-1, ¶ 501, at 5-3 (1998) (“Multidisciplinary
practice . . . is the association of individuals with different professional backgrounds within the
same organization with the goal of providing ‘one stop shopping’ to clients seeking professional
services.”); Ramon M. Mullerat, Remarks on the Report and Recommendations of the ABA
Commission on MDPs (visited Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mullerat2.html> (“An
MDP is understood to be the practice of different professions within the same structure and with
common interests, whether shared directly or indirectly, and in the same or different physical
places.”); FAQs About Multidisciplinary Practices, TEX. LAW., Aug. 9, 1999, at 6 (“[A]n MDP is
a commercial entity in which lawyers are partners with nonlawyers or an entity in which lawyers
work for nonlawyers.”).
4. Jim Flynn, Ask a Lawyer Column, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS: THE GAZETTE
(Colo. Springs, Colo.), Sept. 5, 1999, available in 1999 WL 22012736 (“A multidisciplinary
practice is one where lawyers go into business with other professionals (engineers, accountants,
architects, plumbers, etc.) to provide packaged services to clients.”).
5. Report, supra note 3. See also Hoberman, supra note 2 (“Examples of MDPs include a
partnership consisting of lawyers and accountants providing legal and accounting services or a
professional corporation that provides legal services only but is a wholly-owned subsidiary of an
accounting firm.”).
6. See ABA House of Delegates, supra note 2:
The American Bar Association is the largest voluntary professional association in the
world. With more than 400,000 members, the ABA provides law school accreditation,
continuing legal education, information about the law, programs to assist lawyers and
judges in their work, and initiatives to improve the legal system for the public.
Id. (citing the American Bar Association).
7. See FAQs About Multidisciplinary Practices, supra note 3; Recommendation, supra note
3; Report, supra note 3; MDP Comm’n, Report General Information Form (visited Sept. 23,
1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpgeninfo.html> [hereinafter General Information Form].
8. See generally App. A, supra note 3. The MDP Comm’n’s proposed rule, Model Rule
5.8, “Responsibilities of a Lawyer in a Multidisciplinary Practice,” would read as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer or form a partnership or other
entity with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership or other entity consist of
the practice of law except that a lawyer in an MDP controlled by lawyers may do so,
subject to the present provisions limiting the holding of equity investments in any entity
or organization providing legal services. A lawyer in an MDP not controlled by lawyers
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Although there are various arguments both for and against MDPs, the
emphasis is on the potential benefits and detriments to prospective clients of
may do so, subject to the conditions set forth in paragraphs (c)(1)-(5), and subject to the
present provisions limiting the holding of equity investments in any entity or organization
providing legal services.
(b) A lawyer in an MDP remains subject to all the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
unless this Rule provides otherwise.
(c) A lawyer may practice in an MDP in which lawyers do not own a controlling interest
only if the MDP provides the highest court with the authority to regulate the legal
profession in each jurisdiction in which the MDP is engaged in the delivery of legal
services written undertakings signed by the chief executive officer (or similar official) and
the board of directors (or similar body) that:
(1) it will not directly or indirectly interfere with a lawyer’s exercise of independent
professional judgment on behalf of a client;
(2) it will establish, maintain and enforce procedures designed to protect a lawyer’s
exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a client from interference
by the MDP, any member of the MDP, or any person or entity associated with the
MDP;
(3) it will establish, maintain and enforce procedures to protect a lawyer’s
professional obligation to segregate client funds;
(4) its members will abide by the rules of professional conduct when they are engaged
in the delivery of legal services to a client of the MDP;
(5) it will respect the unique role of the lawyer in society as an officer of the legal
system, a representative of clients and a public citizen having special responsibility
for the administration of justice. This statement should acknowledge that lawyers in
an MDP have the same special obligation to render voluntary pro bono publico legal
service as lawyers practicing solo or in law firms;
(6) it will annually review the procedures established in subsection (2) and amend
them as needed to ensure their effectiveness; and annually certify its compliance with
subsections (1)-(6) and provide a copy of the certification to each lawyer in the MDP;
(7) it will annually file a signed and verified copy of the certificate described in
subsection (6) with the highest court with the authority to regulate the legal profession
in each jurisdiction in which the MDP is engaged in the delivery of legal services,
along with information identifying each lawyer who has been a member of the MDP
during the reporting period, the jurisdiction in which the principal office of each such
lawyer is located, and the jurisdiction(s) in which those lawyers are licensed to
practice law;
(8) it will permit the highest court with the authority to regulate the professional
conduct of lawyers in each jurisdiction in which the MDP is engaged in the delivery
of legal services to review and conduct an administrative audit of the MDP, as each
such authority deems appropriate, to determine and assure compliance with
subsections (1)-(7); and
(9) it will bear the cost of the administrative audit of MDPs described in subparagraph
(8) through the payment of a reasonable annual certification fee.
(d) An MDP that fails to comply with its written undertaking shall be subject to
withdrawal of its permission to deliver legal services or to other appropriate remedial
measures ordered by the court.
Id. See also infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
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MDPs. Proponents of MDPs emphasize clients’ demands for efficiency and
convenience.9 Those who oppose MDPs highlight the need to protect the core
values of the legal profession: the client’s right of loyalty, confidentiality, and
an attorney’s independent professional judgment.10 The pertinent question
becomes whether “it is possible to satisfy the interests of clients and lawyers
by providing the option of an MDP without compromising the core values of
the legal profession that are essential for the protection of clients and the
proper maintenance of the client-lawyer relationship.”11 The Commission
seems to believe that its recommendation will give clients the option of an
MDP and, at the same time, preserve the core values of the legal profession.12
This Comment will examine the issues surrounding the Commission’s
recommendation to allow MDPs. Part II provides the history of MDPs in the
United States. Part III relates arguments for and against changing the ethical
rules to allow MDPs. Part IV lays out the Commission’s recommendation.
Part V sets out potential problems with the recommendation. Part VI
demonstrates alternative approaches and Part VII analyzes the future
implications of MDPs and the Commission’s recommendation. Part VIII, the
author’s analysis, concludes that permitting MDPs, as defined by the
Commission, endangers the protections that are currently guaranteed to clients
seeking legal services and should, thus, be prohibited from operating in the
United States.
II. HISTORY OF MDPS IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

Brief Overview
1. MDPs in Foreign Jurisdictions

MDP is not a new concept. In fact, in Europe, lawyers and tax
accountants have been permitted to work together in MDPs since the end of
World War II.13 Today, MDPs are common in Europe, Australia and
Canada,14 and are rapidly being accepted in other parts of the world.15
9. See MDP Comm’n, Background Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice: Issues and
Developments (visited Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicomreport0199.html>
[hereinafter Background Paper]; Debra Baker, Voices From the Other Side: Accounting Firm
Calls for Changes in Lawyer Conduct Rules, 85 A.B.A. J. 83 (1999).
10. See Background Paper, supra note 9; Baker, supra note 9.
11. Report, supra note 3.
12. See id.
13. See Lloyd Turman, Look Out Lawyers, Here We Come!, ACCT. TODAY, July 5, 1999, at
7; Hoberman, supra note 2.
14. See Rocco Cammarere, Panels at Odds Over MDPs: State Bar, ABA Clash, N.J. LAW.,
June 28, 1999, at 1. See also Haydee Tillotson, Editorial, Changing the Way Lawyers Do
Business, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Cal.), Mar. 3, 1999, at B06 (noting that MDPs are permitted in
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Although the presence of MDPs in foreign countries is becoming more
evident, Switzerland is the only country that permits fully integrated MDPs, or
what the Commission refers to as the “Fully Integrated Model”.16 Under this
model, “there is no free standing law firm.”17 Rather, as provided for in the
Commission’s definition of an MDP, there is a single entity, which employs a
variety of different professionals in order to provide a multitude of services.18
In other foreign countries, the establishment of MDPs is limited to what the
Commission refers to as the “Contract Model.”19 Under the “Contract Model,”
a professional service firm is only able to contract with an independent law
firm.20 At all times, the law firm remains an independent entity controlled and
managed by lawyers.21 This model is also considered an MDP under the
Commission’s definition.22
Spain, Switzerland, Australia and Europe); Ward Bower, Partnership Issues; Multidisciplinary
Professional Practices to Challenge Law Firms, LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP & BENEFITS, June
1999, at 5 [hereinafter Bower, Partnership Issues] (noting that reports surrounding Big Five
activity in Africa and Asia occasionally arise, and that the Big Five occupy some of the largest
law practices in parts of Latin America); Lucy Hickman, Law Soc Votes for MDPs After 10-year
Wait, LAW., Oct. 18, 1999, at 2 (noting that after a 10-year consultation process, the United
Kingdom’s Law Society has opened the door to allow MDPs).
15. See Lawyers Considering Non-Legal Partnerships, PRAC. ACCT. MAG., Aug. 1, 1999, at
8, available in 1999 WL 11608183.
16. App. C, supra note 3. See also MDP Comm’n, Hypotheticals and Models (visited Sept.
23, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicomhypos.html> [hereinafter Hypotheticals and
Models].
17. App. C, supra note 3; Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
18. See App. C, supra note 3; Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16. Under “The Fully
Integrated Model”:
There is a single professional services firm, XYZ Integrates, with organizational units,
such as accounting, business consulting, and legal services. It is the “classic”
multidisciplinary practice. It advertises that it provides “a seamless web” of services,
including legal services. The legal services unit may represent clients who either (1)
retain its services but not those of any other unit of the firm or (2) retain its services as
well as the services of other units in the firm. In the case of (2), the legal and nonlegal
services may be provided in connection with the same matter or different matters.
App. C, supra note 3. See also Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
19. App. C, supra note 3. See also Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
20. App. C, supra note 3; Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
A typical contract might include terms such as (1) the law firm agreeing to identify its
affiliation with the professional services firm on its letterhead and business cards, and its
advertising; (2) the law firm and the professional services firm agreeing to refer clients to
each other on a nonexclusive basis; and (3) the law firm agreeing to purchase goods and
services from the professional services firm such as staff management, communications
technology, and rent for the leasing of office space and equipment.
App. C, supra note 3 (parenthetical information omitted); Hypotheticals and Models, supra note
16 (same).
21. See App. C, supra note 3.
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In contrast to both the “Fully Integrated Model” and the “Contract Model,”
the United States is operating under what the Commission refers to as the
“Cooperative Model.”23 Under this model, attorneys are permitted to employ
or work cooperatively with nonattorney professionals directly retained by the
attorney or the client.24 “To the extent that the nonlawyer professionals are
employed, retained, or associated with a lawyer, the partners in a law firm and
any lawyer having direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer professional
must take steps ‘to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer . . . . ‘“25
Additionally, in the United States, the Commission’s “Law-Related
Services/Ancillary Business Model” is a permissible arrangement in
jurisdictions that have adopted Model Rule 5.726 (responsibilities regarding
law related services).27 Under the “Law-Related Services/Ancillary Business
Model” a law firm can operate an ancillary business that provides various
professional services to clients.28 While attorneys and nonattorneys are
partners, share fees and make joint decisions in the ancillary business,

The contract model might take different forms. In one model, the professional services
firm might contract with a single law firm with only one office. In another, it might
contract with a single law firm with several branch offices. And in still another, it might
contract with separate independent law firms, some of which might have only a single
office; others of which might have several branch offices.
Id.; Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
22. See App. C, supra note 3.
23. Id. Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
24. See App. C, supra note 3; Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
25. App. C, supra note 3 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.3
(1983)); Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16 (same).
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.7 (1983). Model Rule 5.7
states:
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the
provision of law-related services, as defined by paragraph (b), if the law-related services
are provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer’s provision of
legal services to clients; or
(2) by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the
lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the lawrelated services knows that the services of the separate entity are not legal services
and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.
(b) The term “law-related services” denotes services that might reasonably be performed
in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that
are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.
Id.
27. App. C, supra note 3; Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
28. App. C, supra note 3; Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
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nonattorneys are not partners and do not share fees in the law firm.29
Moreover, the lawyers only provide consulting services, not legal services, to
clients of the ancillary business.30 Neither the “Cooperative Model” nor the
“Law-Related Services/Ancillary Business Model” is considered an MDP
under the Commission’s definition.31
Accordingly, in almost all jurisdictions in the United States, partnerships
between attorneys and nonattorneys to provide legal services are strictly
prohibited.32 Although in other professional settings MDPs have been in
existence for some time,33 “there are decades-old rules that prevent accounting
firms, law firms and consulting firms from mingling their businesses.”34 The
District of Columbia is the only jurisdiction in the United States that has
modified its rules to allow attorney and nonattorney partnerships in the
provision of legal services and operates under what the Commission refers to
as the “Command and Control Model.”35

29. See App. C, supra note 3; Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
30. See App. C, supra note 3; Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
31. App. C, supra note 3.
32. See Baker, supra note 9. See also, e.g., Mich. Bar Comm. on Professional and Judicial
Ethics, RI-225 (1995), available in 1995 WL 68958 (“A Michigan lawyer may not form a
partnership for delivery of legal services with a nonlawyer, where any portion of the firm’s
operations will be conducted in Michigan and where the nonlawyer has any financial interest in
or control over the firm’s operations in Michigan or on Michigan legal matters.”); Pa. Bar.
Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 93-100 (1993), available
in 1993 WL 851215 (“Clearly, a lawyer may not enter into a law practice with a nonlawyer in
Pennsylvania.”); S.C. Bar Ethic Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 99-07 (1999), available in 1999
WL 463449 (citing Rule 5.4(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct for the
proposition that “[a] lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the practices
of the partnership consist of the practice of law.”).
33. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Statement of Position on
Multidisciplinary Practice (visited Sept. 23, 1999) <http//www.abanet.org/cpr/abcny.html>. The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York goes on to state:
The juvenile and civil units of many legal services providers employ social workers.
Governments and corporations often employ lawyers and other professionals under the
same roof within the same unit. These organizations have discovered a lesson that is
more broadly applicable – that coordination, teamwork and fully considered strategic
planning are often fostered when professionals from different disciplines work within one
service organization for the same clients.
Id.
34. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Line Between Accounting, Law Professions May Soon Blur,
KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS: MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 14, 1999, available in 1999 WL
13725537. See also discussion infra Part II.C.
35. App. C, supra note 3; Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

636

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:629

2. The District of Columbia’s Rule 5.4
While the District of Columbia (“D.C.”) has modified its rules to permit
fee sharing between attorneys and nonattorneys, even D.C. does not permit the
type of MDPs that are allowed in foreign jurisdictions.36 D.C.’s Rule 5.4
provides that a nonlawyer can obtain an ownership or managerial interest in a
law firm subject to certain requirements.37 First such partnerships and the
sharing of legal fees must be confined to organizations that provide only legal
services.38 Additionally, everyone involved must agree to be bound by the
rules of professional conduct.39 Furthermore, attorneys with managerial
authority must exercise the same amount of control over nonattorneys as they
would over attorneys,40 and finally, the requirements must be in writing.41
According to an ABA Ethics Opinion, if a law firm has offices in multiple
jurisdictions, the firm cannot have nonattorney partners in the D.C. office.42
In 1986, a rule was proposed in North Dakota that would have allowed
lawyers and nonlawyers to share fees and form partnerships to provide legal
services subject to safeguards similar to those enumerated in D.C.’s modified

36. See George A. Riemer, Coming to a City Near You? Issues Surrounding Non-Lawyer
Ownership of Law Firms, 59 OR. ST. B. BULL. 27, 27 (1999).
37. See D.C. CT. R. ANN. Rule 5.4 app. A (1999) (D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct). See
also MDP Comm’n, Updated Background and Informational Report and Request for Comments
(visited Dec. 27, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/febmdp.html> [hereinafter Updated
Background Report]:
The text of the Rule does not define or limit the vocation of the nonlawyer partner.
However, the Comment refers to certified public accountants working in conjunction with
tax lawyers or others who use accountants’ services in performing legal services,
economists working in a firm with antitrust or public utility practitioners, psychologists or
psychiatric social workers working with family law practitioners to assist in counseling
clients, and nonlawyer lobbyists working with lawyers who perform legislative services.
Finally, the Comment specifies the rule does not permit partnership for the purpose of
investment.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
38. See D.C. CT. R. ANN. Rule 5.4 (b)(1) app. A (1999) (D.C. Rules of Professional
Conduct). “The practical impact of the Washington D.C. rule is that accountants and other
professionals may become partners in a law firm while lawyers may not become partners in an
accounting firm or other professional services firm on whose behalf they deliver legal services to
clients.” App. C, supra note 3. In contrast to D.C.’s modified version of Rule 5.4, the MDP
Comm’n’s recommendation does not require the firm to be engaged solely in the practice of law.
See Rocco Cammarere, Multi-disciplinaries Alive and Well in Washington, N.J. LAW., Nov. 29,
1999, at 4 [hereinafter Cammarere, MDPs Alive in Washington].
39. See D.C. CT. R. ANN. Rule 5.4 (b)(2) app. A (1999) (D.C. Rules of Professional
Conduct).
40. See id. Rule 5.4 (b)(3).
41. See id. Rule 5.4 (b)(4).
42. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-360 (1991).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES

637

version of Rule 5.4, but the state’s Supreme Court struck it down.43 Thus,
D.C. remains the only jurisdiction in the United States that allows partnerships
between attorneys and nonattorneys to provide legal services44 and,
supposedly, D.C.’s version of Model Rule 5.4 has not caused any ethics
complaints.45 While the Commission’s “Command and Control Model” is
based on D.C.’s modified version of Model Rule 5.4, it is not considered an
MDP under the Commission’s definition since MDPs under the Commission’s
definition are not restricted to providing solely legal services.46
3. Development of the Model Rules in the United States
Explicit rules banning fee sharing between attorneys and nonattorneys did
not exist when the ABA originally adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics
(“Canons”)47 in 1908.48 Twenty years later, “the ABA added Canons 33
through 35, Model Rule 5.4’s predecessors.”49 Although these Canons
expressed a ban against the formation of partnerships between attorneys and
nonattorneys, this ban was expressed in “precatory,” not “mandatory,”
language.50 ABA Ethics Opinions, however, reinforced this precatory
language.51 According to these opinions, if an attorney was employed or
43. See Gianluca Morello, Note, Big Six Accounting Firms Shop Worldwide for Law Firms:
Why Multidiscipline Practices Should be Permitted in the United States, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
190, 204 (1997) (footnotes omitted); Partnership with Non-Lawyers, 91 Law. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 401 (1998).
44. See Partnership With Non-Lawyers, supra note 43.
45. See Cammarere, MDPs Alive in Washington, supra note 38 (noting that “the head of the
District of Columbia Bar’s ethics office [Susan D. Gilbert] testified that the district’s version of
Rule 5.4(b) has not generated ethics complaints.”).
46. App. C, supra note 3.
47. The Canons represent the ABA’s first attempt to “study and promulgate a
comprehensive set of ethical standards for the attorney. The resulting 1908 Canons of Ethics
were primarily based on the Alabama Bar’s 1887 Code.” James E. Moliterno & John M. Levy,
ETHICS OF THE LAWYER’S WORK 55 (1993).
48. See Report, supra note 3.
49. Id. See also infra note 121.
50. Report, supra note 3. But see L. Harold Levinson, Comment on Report and
Recommendations of ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (visited Sept. 23, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/levinson3.html> (noting that the concept underlying the prohibitions
against MDPs has a deep history in centuries of common law); John Gibeaut, Share the Wealth:
ABA Panel Proposes Fee-Splitting with Other Professions, 85 A.B.A.J. 14 (1999) [hereinafter
Gibeaut, Share the Wealth] (noting that “[c]ritics of fee-sharing often suggest that the ban is
inextricably rooted deep in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence.”); Martin Paskind, The
Legal Profession and the Rise of MDPs, ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 30, 1999, at 5, available in 1999
WL 23296351 (noting that the history of Egyptian, Greek and Roman lawyers indicates they
practiced law by themselves).
51. See generally ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. C-630 (1963)
(discussing the rules and circumstances under which a lawyer could share office space with a
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entered into a partnership with an accountant or other professional, the
attorney could no longer practice as an “attorney at law.”52 Even the sharing
of office space between attorneys and other professionals was generally
discouraged.53 Many rules and safeguards were implemented so that such
arrangements would not be confused with partnerships.54
In 1969, the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(“Model Code,”)55 which prohibited the formation of partnerships between
attorneys and nonattorneys in blatant and mandatory language.56 These
prohibitions were kept intact when the Model Rules57 were adopted in 1983.58
The ABA House of Delegates, however, critically reexamined the Model Code
before adopting the Model Rules.59

C.P.A.); ABA Comm’n on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 612 (1962) (discussing the unethical
nature of a lawyer occupying a suite with a collection agency); ABA Comm’n on Professional
Ethics, Informal Op. 608 (1962) (discussing the rules and circumstances under which a lawyer
could share office space with an insurance adjuster).
52. See generally ABA Comm’n on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 269
(1945) (stating that an attorney at law who was employed or entered into a partnership with a
certified public accountant could only perform the activities that an accountant traditionally
performed).
53. See generally supra note 51.
54. See generally id. Even more recent ethics opinions indicate that the sharing of office
space between attorneys and nonattorneys is allowed but strictly regulated:
[t]he need to create and maintain an office setting and operation that avoids confusion as
to the scope of one’s dealings as a lawyer . . . is imperative . . . . Thus, the physical layout
of the office must be arranged in a fashion that makes it clear to all clients and others that
they are dealing with the firm at times when in fact this is the case. Door signs, telephone
listings and receptionist contacts, for example, must enable those who deal with the
office-sharers to discern readily whether their dealings are with one acting as a lawyer or
with one acting in a private business capacity. Care also must be taken to separate legal
files from those belonging to the business.
ABA Comm’n on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1482 (1982).
55. The Model Code was adopted by the ABA in 1969 in order to replace the Canons,
which, due to changes in the practice of law, “seemed incapable of predictable interpretation.”
Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the
Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1117 (1999).
56. See Report, supra note 3.
57. The Model Rules were adopted to replace the Model Code due to what were perceived
to be several weaknesses in the Model Code. See Daly, supra note 55.
58. See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has
the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 593 (1989).
59. See id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES

639

4. The Kutack Commission’s Proposed Rule
In 1982, the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
(“Kutack Commission”) proposed a rule that would have allowed nonlawyers
to obtain an ownership interest in a law firm subject to certain ethical
requirements.60 The Kutack Commission spent five years reviewing the
Model Code and ultimately concluded that, “it is impractical to define
organizational forms that can uniquely guarantee compliance with the Rules of
Professional Conduct” since “there are a variety of modern legal
services, . . .” all of which “raise problems concerning the client-lawyer
relationship.”61 Ultimately, however, several objections were raised and thus,
the ABA House of Delegates dropped the Kutack Commission’s proposal
when the Model Rules were adopted.62

60. See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, reprinted in American Bar Association (ABA), 1 MATERIALS ON MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 98 (1982) (1982 Annual Meeting). The Kutack
Commission’s proposed Rule 5.4 provided:
A lawyer may be employed by an organization in which a financial interest is held or
managerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, or by a lawyer acting in a capacity
other than that of representing clients, such as a business corporation, insurance company,
legal services organization or government agency, but only if:
(a) There is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or
with the client-lawyer relationship;
(b) Information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6;
(c) The organization does not engage in advertising or personal contract with prospective
clients if a lawyer employed by the organization would be prohibited from doing so by
Rule 7.2 or 7.3; and
(d) The arrangement does not result in charging a fee that violates Rule 1.5.
Id. In other words:
The Kutack Commission’s proposed Rule 5.4 permitted any organization delivering legal
services, owned or managed in whole or in part by a nonlawyer, to employ an attorney if
the organization respected the attorney’s professional judgment, protected a client’s
confidential information, avoided impermissible advertising and client solicitation, and
charged reasonable fees.
Morello, supra note 43, at 210 (footnotes omitted).
61. COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 60
(quoting a Comment to the Commission’s proposed Rule 5.4); Andrews, supra note 58, at 593-94
(same).
62. See Morello, supra note 43, at 212; Background Paper, supra note 9. The following
objections were raised:
(1) the Commission proposal would permit Sears, Montgomery Ward, H & R Block, or
the Big Eight accounting firms, to open law offices in competition with traditional law
firms; (2) nonlawyer ownership of law firms would interfere with the lawyer’s
professional independence; (3) nonlawyer ownership would destroy the lawyer’s ability to
be a ‘professional’ [sic] regardless of the economic cost; and (4) the proposed change
would have a fundamental but unknown effect on the legal profession.
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5. Establishing the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
On August 4, 1998, the ABA established the Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice to research and examine the practice of law in the
United States and abroad.63 The twelve-person Commission consisted of
attorneys, judges and academicians.64 They were instructed to study MDPs

Id. (footnote omitted). See also General Information Form, supra note 7. (noting that in 1983
the proposal to eliminate fee sharing was ultimately rejected because it permitted passive
investment and did not contain safeguards to ensure compliance with the other applicable ethical
rules).
63. See ABA President Philip S. Anderson Appoints Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice (News Release) (visited Dec. 27, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org.cpr/newsrelease/multi
com.html>; App. C, supra note 3:
Other issues committed to the Commission’s attention included: (1) the experience of
clients, foreign and domestic, who have received legal services from professional services
firms, and the relevant international trade developments; (2) existing state and federal
legislative framework within which professional services firms may be providing legal
services and any modifications to that framework that would be in the public interest; (3)
the impact of receiving legal services from professional services firms on a client’s ability
to protect privileged communications and to have the benefit of advice free from conflicts
of interest; and (4) the application of current ethical rules and principles to the provision
of legal services by professional services firms and any modifications or additions that
would best serve the public interest.
Id.
64. See Background Paper, supra note 9; see also Members of the Commission on
Multidisciplinary
Practice
(visited
Dec.
27,
1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
multicommembers.html>. The MDP Comm’n is chaired by Sherwin P. Simmons, a partner and
chair of the Tax Department in the Miami, Florida law firm of Steel, Hector & Davis, and a past
chair of the ABA Section of Taxation and former member of the ABA Board of Governors.
Other members consist of Carol O. Bradford, a judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia and a past chair of the ABA Commission on Homelessness and Poverty; Phoebe A.
Haddon, a professor at Temple University School of Law and a member of the ABA Standing
Committee on Professionalism; Geoffrey C. Hazzard, Jr., a professor at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, director of the American Law Institute and the reporter for the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct; Roberta Reiff Katz, senior vice president, general counsel
and secretary of Netscape Communications Corp. and author of JUSTICE MATTERS: RESCUING
THE LEGAL SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY; Carolyn Lamm, a partner in the Washington D.C.,
office of White & Case and a member of the ABA House of Delegates; Robert H. Mundheim,
senior executive vice president and general counsel of Salomon Smith Barney Holdings, Inc., and
a member of the Council of The American Law Institute; Steven C. Nelson, a partner in the law
firm of Dorsey & Whitney in Minneapolis, Minn., and a past chair of the ABA Section of
International Law Practice; Burnele V. Powell, dean of the School of Law of the University of
Missouri at Kansas City, and chair of the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Governing
Committee; Michael Traynor, a member of the San Francisco law firm of Cooley Godward, 2nd
Vice President of the American Law Institute and Fellow of the American Bar Foundation; and
Herbert S. Wander, a partner in the law firm of Katten Muchen & Zavis, Chicago, Ill., and a past
chair of the ABA Section of Business Law. The Reporter for the MDP Comm’n is Mary C.
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from the standpoint of the “public’s best interest.”65 Although empirical data
was not available,66 the Commission conducted research and held public
hearings to obtain information about MDPs within the United States and in
foreign countries.67
The Commission “concluded that such a change [MDPs] was in the best
interest of the public, would expand the availability of legal services, and
would facilitate the development of a new business structure enabling lawyers
to reconfigure their practices to assist clients in resolving multidisciplinary
problems.”68 Thus, on June 8, 1999, the Commission issued a report and
recommendation proposing amendments be made to the Model Rules to allow
attorney and nonattorney partnerships which provide legal as well as nonlegal
services.69
On August 10, 1999, the ABA’s House of Delegates (“House”) voted to
postpone deciding the issue so that the Commission could conduct “additional
study.”70 The House wanted proof that the public’s interests could be served

Daly, a Professor of Legal Ethics at Fordham University School of Law and the Director of the
law school’s Stein Institute of Law and Ethics. Id.
65. Background Paper, supra note 9; ABA President Philip S. Anderson Appoints
Commission, supra note 63 (noting that the MDP Comm’n “must set aside the financial interests
of the profession and ensure the public interest is served.”).
66. See Report, supra note 3.
67. See Riemer, supra note 36; see also Report, supra note 3 (emphasizing that “the
Commission has heard sixty hours of testimony from fifty-six witness from around the world and
received written and oral communications from numerous others.”); App. C, supra note 3
(reporting that “the Commission conducted seven days of open hearings and met in executive
session on six occasions . . . . The Commission also maintained a comprehensive web site on
which it posted summaries of the testimony, significant background material, and the comments it
received (See http:\\www.abanet.org/cpr/multicom.html)”).
68. Updated Background Report, supra note 37.
69. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 33; General Information
Form, supra note 7; Recommendation, supra note 3; Report, supra note 3. The recommendation
and report were unanimously supported by MDP Comm’n members. Id.
70. See ABA House of Delegates Calls for Additional Study of Multidisciplinary Practice,
supra note 2; Janet L. Conley, ABA Postpones Its Decision on Multidisciplinary Practice,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter Conley, ABA Postpones Decision] (reporting that the
call for “additional study” was approved by a 304-98 vote). The House was reacting to a
resolution of The Florida Bar that read as follows:
Resolved, that the American Bar Association make no change, addition or amendment to
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which permits a lawyer to offer legal services
through a multidisciplinary practice unless and until additional study demonstrates that
such changes will further the public interest without sacrificing or comprising lawyer
independence and the legal profession’s tradition of loyalty to clients.
Updated Background Report, supra note 37; Florida Bar Recommendation Statement (visited
Dec. 27, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/flbarrec.html>.
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without infringing upon the core values of the legal profession.71 Most likely,
the issue will be presented to the ABA again in July 2000.72 The Commission
intends to conduct additional research and hearings with the hope of
presenting a new report to the House at that time.73
B.

Factors Giving Rise to the ABA’s Reconsideration of MDPs in the United
States
1. The “Big Five” Accounting Firms

Throughout the 1990s, the Big Five accounting firms (“Big Five”)74
bought existing law firms and set up legal practices in Europe.75 Since the
ethical restraints on legal practice are more relaxed in Europe and other
countries, accounting firms have been permitted to engage in all kinds of legal
practice.76 Although these firms initially employed attorneys to offer

71. See Conley, ABA Postpones Decision, supra note 70; Updated Background Report,
supra note 37.
72. See Conley, ABA Postpones Decision, supra note 70.
73. See What Do You Think About Multidisciplinary Practice, 28 ABA SEC. LAB. &
EMPLOYMENT 1, 1 (1999). See also Cammarere, MDPs Alive in Washington, supra note 38
(noting that “[t]he report that comes before the ABA House of Delegates this summer could be
vastly different from the proposal rejected last August.”).
74. See generally Regulation of Bar: Vocal Debate on MDP Report Continues as Both Sides
Prepare for Delegates’ Vote, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 323, July 7, 1999
[hereinafter Vocal Debate on MDP Report]. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, KPMG,
Deloitte & Touche and Arthur Andersen are known as the “Big Five” accounting firms. Id.
Earlier articles or journals may refer to Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P as one of the big accounting
firms and thereby refer to the “Big Six” accounting firms. See, e.g., Morello, supra note 43, at
201. However, within the past few years, Coopers & Lybrand merged with Pricewaterhouse
forming PricewaterhouseCoopers. See Goodman, supra note 34.
75. See Gibeaut, Share the Wealth, supra note 50. See also Morello, supra note 43, at 193203. Pricewaterhouse operates a law firm in the United Kingdom under the name Arnheim &
Co. and operates a network of other law firms in Europe. Arthur Andersen operates a legal
practices in the United Kingdom called Garrett & Co., the Netherlands named Wouters
Advocaten, and Spain known as J & A Garrigues Andersen y Cia. KMPG Peat Marwick L.L.P.
operates a legal department in France under the name KMPG Fidal Peat. Deloitte & Touche
L.L.P. formed an alliance with the Dutch law firm, Van Anken Knuppe Damstra, and Ernst &
Young, L.L.P. has several cooperation agreements with Dutch law firms and has legal practices
in Switzerland, Spain, Germany, and France. Id.
76. See Gibeaut, Share the Wealth, supra note 50; see also App. C, supra note 3 (“While
precise data on the extent to which the Big Five are offering legal services outside the United
States is not available, the evidence of their emergence as an alternative provider is
overwhelming.”); Hoberman, supra note 2:
In many European communities nonlawyers are permitted to offer legal advice as long as
their credentials are not misrepresented. Although nonlawyers cannot appear in court,
they may provide transactional services, advise on tax matters, etc. Accordingly,
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accounting and tax consulting, over the past ten years they have expanded
their consulting services to include “advising clients on the direct application
of the law to the facts, negotiating transactions, and drafting legal
documents.”77 Currently, the Big Five are informally considered the world’s
largest law firms and,78 in addition to standard consulting services, they are
“aggressively soliciting . . . traditional legal work . . . .”79
The Big Five were the first major proponents of MDPs in the United
States.80 Currently in the United States, attorneys in accounting firms are not
permitted to offer any services beyond a straightforward consultation, such as
tax saving advice.81 However, for years the Big Five have been attempting to
practice law in the United States.82 Several key factors demonstrate the Big
Five’s recent expansion in the United States and their determination to become
recognized legal service providers.83
First, in addition to informally becoming the largest law firms in other
parts of the world, the Big Five have been successfully recruiting lawyers
within the United States.84 Furthermore, information suggests that lawyers

accounting firms have long been providing legal services in many parts of Europe and
from that was created the first MDPs.
Id.
77. Background Paper, supra note 9.
78. See Goodman, supra note 34 (“Ernst & Young has 3,300 tax lawyers worldwide and 850
lawyers in this country . . . . PricewaterhouseCoopers employs 3,000 lawyers around the
world . . . . By comparison, the country’s largest law firm, Baker & McKenzie, employs 2,000
lawyers.”).
79. Cearley, supra note 2.
80. See id.
81. See Goodman, supra note 34; see also Background Paper, supra note 9. (“The legal
profession has generally acknowledged the right of an accounting firm to provide services to its
clients that call for an understanding and application of federal law relating to the taxation of
property, goods and services.”); Conley, ABA Postpones Decision, supra note 70. (reporting that
Sherwin Simmons, the chair of the MDP Comm’n, informed the House that “the Big Five
accounting firms, American Express, H & R Block and other companies already offer
‘consulting’ services in areas including tax, human resources, health care and insurance law.”)
82. See Accountants Welcome MDP Breakthrough, INT’L TAX REV., July 1, 1999, at 4; see
also John Gibeaut, Squeeze Play: As Accountants Edge Into the Legal Market, Lawyers May Find
Themselves Not Only Blindsided by the Assault But Also Limited by the Professional Rules, 84
A.B.A. J. 42 (1998) [hereinafter Gibeaut, Squeeze Play] (noting that “[i]n the United States, most
observers agree, the accounting giants are also muscling into the legal market. They already offer
an array of services, such as appraisals, financial planning, litigation support, alternative dispute
resolution and, of course, international tax practice.”).
83. See Background Paper, supra note 9.
84. See id. See also Accountants Welcome MDP Breakthrough, supra note 82 (pointing out
that “[t]he recent spate of tax lawyer recruitment by the big five [sic] has confirmed their
determination to offer a complete tax service, even if it would have to be through a ‘parallel
firm.’”); Updated Background Report, supra note 37:
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employed by the Big Five are offering to represent clients in federal district
courts or courts of federal claims.85 At the same time, the Big Five have
successfully lobbied Congress in support of a new federal tax practitionerclient privilege86 to “mitigate, if not eliminate, . . . inter-professional
differences.”87 Moreover, the Big Five have been building strategic alliances
among themselves and law firms in the United States.88 One of the most
recent developments in the Big Five’s crusade is Ernst & Young’s opening of
a law office (McKee Nelson Ernst & Young) in D.C.89 Although this is not
the first time one of the Big Five has attempted to encroach on legal territory
in the United States, this is the first time such a firm has been so blatantly
obvious in its purpose.90
The Big Five’s determination to practice law in the United States has made
them active proponents in the MDP movement and a driving force behind the
ABA’s decision to create the Commission.91 At the same time, MDP is no
longer just an issue among the Big Five.92

While the quantitative growth in the number of lawyers is impressive, even more
impressive is the firms’ success in recruiting tax partners from leading law firms and
prominent government lawyers to join the Big Five and in persuading law students to join
their staffs directly after graduation rather than following the more traditional law-firm
career path.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
85. See Background Paper, supra note 9; see also Gibeaut, Squeeze Play, supra note 82
(reporting that since 1992, Arthur Andersen has been filing petitions (over 60) in the Federal Tax
Court in Texas).
86. See I.R.C. § 7525; Background Paper, supra note 9.
87. Salch, supra note 3, ¶ 500, at 5-2.
88. See Background Paper, supra note 9; Updated Background Report, supra note 37. In
1997, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Miller & Chevalier, a Washington D.C. law firm, built a
strategic alliance. In August 1999, KPMG announced the creation of a strategic alliance with
members of Saltnet, a network of state and local lawyers. Morrison & Forester and Horwood
Marcus Berk are two firms that joined the alliance. Id.
89. See Cammarere, MDPs Alive in Washington, supra note 38.
90. See Carol M. Langford & Richard Zitrin, Has the MDP Train Left the Station?, N.J.L.J.,
Nov. 29, 1999, at 20. “[W]hile Ernst & Young claims its plan is just another strategic alliance, it
is directly financing the law firm’s launch. The company claims it’s not actually sharing profits,
but Ernst & Young is hardly doing this out of pro bono spirit. And there’s no getting around that
firm name.” Id.
91. See Goodman, supra note 34; see also Geoffrey C. Hazzard, Jr., Bar’s MDP Moves
Risky, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 13, 1999, at A29 (noting that “the MDP ‘problem’ for the legal
profession . . . arises primarily from the expansion and diversification of the big accounting
firms . . . .”).
92. See Lee Smalley Edmon, President’s Page: Our Changing Profession, 22 LOS ANGELES
LAW. 11, 11 (1999).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES

645

2. Current Practices
Ethical concerns surrounding the current practices of professional service
firms (e.g., the Big Five) is one of the main reasons the ABA created a
Commission to study MDPs.93 Attorneys currently practicing in professional
service firms in the United States claim that such firms do not offer legal
services.94 The same professional service firms found abroad claim they do
provide legal services.95 At the same time, other service arrangements in the
United States may be creating problems.96 For example, if an attorney shares a
“cozy” relationship with a chiropractor or private investigator or if a financial
planner has an attorney on staff to draft documents, an unethical arrangement
that violates the legal profession’s ethics rules may exist.97
Ultimately, these questionable relationships and practices have left many
feeling that MDPs already exist in de facto form. 98 This general feeling has
led to complaints from attorneys that “other professions are invading practice
areas lawyers historically have regarded as theirs alone.”99 According to
commentators, traditional divisions between different professions are no
longer clear.100 Accountants, bankers, insurers, and stockbrokers are entering

93. See General Information Form, supra note 7.
94. See id.
95. See General Information Form, supra note 7; see also Gibeaut, Squeeze Play, supra note
82 (“[W]hile the accounting firms insist they are not practicing law, it may all be a matter of
semantics. What lawyers would contend is law practice, accountants call ‘consulting.’”). But see
Vocal Debate on MDP Report, supra note 74 (noting the comments of Bernard Wolfman of
Harvard Law School who believes that “[i]f those lawyers are violating the current prohibition
against fee-sharing with nonlawyers, . . . the organized bar ought to be dealing with that issue.”
Wolfman stated, “[w]e shouldn’t assume that because they are violating the law we have to
legitimate them.”).
96. See Jennifer Gille Bacon, President’s Message: Multidisciplinary Practice, MO. B.
BULL., Sept. 1999, at 2, 8.
97. Id.
98. See Bower, Partnership Issues, supra note 14.
99. Gibeaut, Share the Wealth, supra note 50. See also Bower, Partnership Issues, supra
note 14 (noting that “recently, major accounting firms have acquired litigation support service
companies in the United States, and some have hired experienced litigators to attempt to preempt
dispute resolution and front-end litigation services . . . by the law firm and to assist in the
application of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to avoid litigation.”).
100. See, e.g., Gibeaut, Share the Wealth, supra note 50; Edward Brodsky, ABA Endorsement
of Multidisciplinary Practices, N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1999, at 3:
In recent years, the sharp line between the provision of legal and the provision of nonlegal services has begun to blur, in the United States and especially overseas. In the U.S.,
the line between lawyers and accountants has already begun to give way. Accounting
firms may now represent clients in Tax Court, and Congress recently created an
“accountant-client privilege” under the Internal Revenue Code. Consulting firms have
recently begun offering, and aggressively promoting “services remarkably similar to those
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into areas of practice that, at one time, solely belonged to attorneys.101 Thus,
the ABA created the Commission to address these complaints,102 to guarantee
that clients are protected and to insure that nonattorneys are not participating
in the unauthorized practice of law.103
3. Competition
Another impetus behind the MDP movement is competition from
professional service firms (e.g., the Big Five).104 Traditional firms find it hard
to compete with the Big Five and others who have the ability to share fees in
other countries, employ many different types of professionals and provide a
wider variety of services to clients.105 Moreover, the ability to employ these
different professionals has given the Big Five the advantage of “tens of
thousands of employees,” all of whom market and promote their firms.106
Additionally, the size of these firms and the number of partners provides for an
abundance of capital.107
“Brand-name recognition” also gives the Big Five an advantage over law
firms in the United States because it allows them to charge premium fees to

traditionally offered by law firms, such as advice on mergers and acquisitions, estate
planning, human resources, and litigation support systems.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
101. See Gibeaut, Share the Wealth, supra note 50. See also Bower, Partnership Issues,
supra note 14:
[I]t is not only accounting firms that are invading the traditional preserve of the
independent law firm. Consider, for example: In Washington, D.C. nonlawyers . . . may
take an ownership position in a law firm and share in profits; In many jurisdictions, labor,
environmental and employee benefits consulting firms hire lawyers to provide the same
services to the consultancy’s clients that those lawyers previously provided to their law
firm’s clients; Banks, insurance companies and financial planning firms all hire lawyers to
perform estate planning and estate administration services.
Id.
102. See Gibeaut, Share the Wealth, supra note 50.
103. See Report, supra note 3; Edmon, supra note 92, at 12, 15.
104. See Janet L. Conley, ABA Takes on Multidisciplinary Practice, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 5, 1999,
at 1 [hereinafter Conley, ABA Takes on MDP] (noting a comment by Morton A. Harris, a partner
at Hatcher, Stubbs, Land, Hollis & Rothschild); see also Mike Fimea, Ethical Issues Worry AZ
Bar, ARIZ. BUS. GAZETTE, Aug. 19, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 8420878 (noting that
“[m]uch of the support—and the controversy—is rooted in economic issues. Law practices face
increased competition from accounting firms that offer legal-related consulting services.”).
105. See Fimea, supra note 104.
106. Bower, Partnership Issues, supra note 14.
107. See id. (“The sheer size of accounting firms means that capital is available from
thousands of partners, rather than only hundreds of partners, in even the very largest of the law
firms in the world.”).
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clients.108 Also, in contrast to law firms in the United States, the Big Five
spend significant amounts on advertising and have many years of experience
in marketing intangible services.109 The Big Five’s extensive experience with
advertising and the amount of money they spend developing it has assisted
them in developing effective and sophisticated advertising campaigns to
market and promote their name brands.110
Furthermore, professional service firms such as the Big Five are
experienced and skilled at cross-selling intangible services, and their status as
international providers allots them “a clear advantage in marketing ‘one stop
shopping’ to multinational clients.”111 With an institutional client base, high
leverage, cutting edge technology and significant investment in research and
development, the Big Five easily advances their competitive edge over
traditional law firms.112
4. Clients’ Changing Demands
Clients’ changing demands were yet another inspiration behind the MDP
movement and the ABA’s decision to create the Commission.113 Clients’
problems are not just legal anymore.114 Recent developments in technology,
108. Id. (“Recent studies appear to show brand-name recognition to be worth a significant
premium on fees in a professional services marketplace.”).
109. See id. (“The advertising budgets of some of the Big Five are greater than the gross
revenues of even the largest law firms.”).
110. See id.
111. Bower, Partnership Issues, supra note 14.
112. See id.
113. See Background Paper, supra note 9.
114. See James Lafferty, Time to Change Rules to Allow for One-Stop Law Firms, HOUS.
CHRON., Dec. 6, 1999, at A25. Various hypotheticals demonstrate the multitude of issues raised
by clients’ problems. “Estate planning is an excellent example. A senior citizen, not in the best
of health, decides to make major changes in his will. He obviously needs a lawyer. But he also
may require a financial adviser, an accountant, an expert on philanthropy and perhaps even a
physician and a social worker.” Id. Further, “[c]onsider real estate transactions. When you buy
a home in some states, you need a real estate agent, a lawyer, an appraiser, a title searcher, a
mortgage lender, an insurance agent and perhaps even a radon tester or termite specialist.” Lora
H. Weber, Consumer Choice Crucial, TEX. LAW., Aug. 9, 1999, at 38. Additionally:
The same kind of innovative solution would apply to adding on to an existing home. Say
you’ve talked to an architect about expanding the kitchen and adding a family room on
the back of your house. But then you need to consult a structural engineer to look at the
plans, you need a landscaper to help you figure out where to move the garden, a tax
advisor to help you understand the tax implications of putting money into your home, and
you need a lawyer with expertise in zoning laws to make sure the whole idea doesn’t get
rejected by the town zoning board. Again, the best possible outcome for many consumers
is an operation that provides all these services in one package.
Written Remarks of Lora H. Weber (visited Jan. 6, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/weber1.
html>. Also, consider small business owners:
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the globalization of the economy and government regulation of commercial
and private activities have changed the ways in which a client requires legal
services.115 Today’s clients are more sophisticated, and the issues they bring
to an attorney are more complex than before.116 A client’s problem might
require the input of many different professionals to obtain a complete and
satisfactory answer or solution.117
Moreover, “today, clients demand
convenience and a higher quality product that comes from integrating all their
financial, personal and legal needs into one comprehensive financial, legal
and/or business plan.”118 Many believe the only way to meet this demand is
through a team of integrated professionals.119

[S]tarting a business is a complex process. It requires lawyers, accountants, financial
planners, tax advisors, experts in information technology resources, perhaps even such
things as printers, graphic designers and web page designers. Again, an entity that
provides these and other types of services in a package would be very interesting to
entrepreneurs.
Id.
115. See id; see also Turman, supra note 13 (noting that “MDPs are a direct outgrowth of the
globalization of the economy: new technologies have eliminated geographical and physical
boundaries and increased client sophistication demands integrated service.”).
116. See Written Remarks of Stefan F. Tucker Submitted to the Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice (visited Oct. 18, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/tucker1.html>
[hereinafter Written Remarks of Tucker]; see also Joe Dwyer III, Carlie, Walsh Weigh in on Lawaccounting Union, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., Aug. 2, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 24027098
(Interview) (Tom Walsh, President of Suelthaus & Walsh, P.C., notes that “[i]n the global
economy, even medium-size and family owned businesses need wide ranging, global solutions to
their problems. This lends itself to a consolidation among providers of those services. The
educated client is really the driving force behind these changes to create a one-stop shop for
professional services.”).
117. See Turman, supra note 13; see also Lafferty, supra note 114:
In a virtual, 24-hour world, problems that involve multidisciplinary solutions need to be
addressed simultaneously by seasoned advisers from four or even more professions
interacting in one location . . . . As business – and life – have grown more complex,
problems increasingly require the assistance of not just lawyers, but also accountants,
bankers, engineers, environmental analysts, financial advisors, labor consultants, land-use
specialists, realtors, scientists, social workers and tax planners – even psychologists and
psychiatrists.
Id. Additionally:
As the Baby Boomer generation ages, individual clients more than ever before need
coordinated advise from lawyers, financial planners, accountants, social workers, and
psychologists. As the global economy expands, both Wall Street and Main Street
business clients look to teams of professionals from different disciplines for consolidated
advice on complex commercial and regulatory matters.
Background Paper, supra note 9.
118. Turman, supra note 13. See also App. C, supra note 3 (noting that the testimony before
the MDP Comm’n offered “overwhelming support for the proposition that individual clients need
integrated professional advice in any number of areas, including estate planning, small business
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C. Model Rules Traditionally Preventing the Development of MDPs
In the United States, legal ethics rules are blocking the development of
MDPs.120 Model Rule 5.4121 (fee sharing) is probably considered the single
largest barrier to MDPs.122 However, many other ABA Model Rules and
Disciplinary Rules in the ABA’s Model Code (insofar as they have been
adopted by the states), coupled with Unauthorized Practice of Law statutes
(“UPL statutes”)123, have traditionally prevented attorneys and nonattorneys

consulting, accounting, and regulatory compliance.”). But see Regulation of Bar: Before the
Vote, MDP Commission Already Knew It has a Difficult Task, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 398, Aug. 18, 1999 (reporting that “a number of those who testified questioned
whether there really is any genuine consumer demand for ‘one stop shopping’ for professional
services.” Moreover, Steven C. Nelson, a member of the MDP Comm’n, noted that it is hard to
tell if people want MDPs until MDPs are allowed to operate.).
119. See, e.g., Lafferty, supra note 114; Turman, supra note 13; Written Remarks of Tucker,
supra note 116.
120. See Goodman, supra note 34; Cearley, supra note 2; Morello, supra note 43, at 203.
121. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1983):
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or associate may
provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer’s
death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared
lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay up to the estate or other
representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or
retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on profit sharing
arrangement.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the
partnership consists of the practice of law.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to
render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment
in rendering such legal services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or
association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the
estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time
during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a
lawyer.
Id.
122. See generally App. C, supra note 3; Morello, supra note 43, at 205; Cearley, supra note
2.
123. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-1 (Michie 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-501 (1999);
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6126 (Deering 1976). See also App. C, supra note 3. (“Generally
speaking, UPL statutes have two primary effects: to keep nonlawyers from offering legal
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from forming partnerships to provide legal services, along with other services,
to the public.124 With the exception of D.C., all jurisdictions in the United
States have followed the ABA’s lead by implementing disciplinary rules
prohibiting partnerships between attorneys and nonattorneys for the purpose of
providing legal services.125
The UPL statutes were enacted primarily to protect the public from
incompetence and to preserve an attorney’s independence.126 Likewise, the
professional conduct rules were primarily implemented by the ABA and the
states to guard against ethical dilemmas by preserving and protecting the
independence of an attorney’s judgment in serving clients.127
Yet,

services; and to keep lawyers from offering legal services to the clients of the lawyers corporate
employers.”).
124. See App. C, supra note 3; Morello, supra note 43, at 194-95, 203-04; MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983) (confidentiality); id. Rule 1.7 (conflicts of interest); id.
Rule 2.1 (independent professional judgment); id. Rule 5.4 (fee sharing, lawyer-nonlawyer
partnership, and independent professional judgment); id. Rule 5.5. (unauthorized practice of law);
id. Rule 5.7 (law-related services); id. Rule 7.2 (advertising); id. Rule 7.3 (client solicitation);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A) (advertising); id. DR 2-103(A),
(B) (client solicitation); id. DR 3-101(A) (unauthorized practice of law); id. DR 3-102(A) (fee
sharing); id. DR 3-103(A), 5-107(C) (lawyer-nonlawyer partnership); id. DR 4-101
(confidentiality); id. DR 5-101(A), 5-104(B) (conflicts of interest); id. DR 5-107(C) (independent
professional judgment). See also Morello, supra note 43, at 252 n.25 (listing the aforementioned
Rules as those that have traditionally prohibited the development of MDPs); Salch, supra note 3,
¶ 504, at 5-7-5-13 (noting that the difficulties in the evolution of MDPs springs from Model
Rules 1.6 (confidentiality), 1.7 (conflicts of interest), 1.9 (conflicts of interest: former clients),
1.10 (imputed disqualification), 5.4 (fee sharing, lawyer-nonlawyer partnership, and independent
professional judgment) 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law), 1.17 (sale of law practice)); M. Peter
Moser, Rethinking Lawyer Professional Regulation, The Argument for Change, 9 EXPERIENCE 4,
6 (1999) (noting Model Rules 5.4 (fee sharing, lawyer-nonlawyer partnership, and independent
professional judgment), 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law), 1.7 (conflicts of interest), 1.9
(conflicts of interest: former clients) and 1.10 (imputed disqualification) as a few of the
professional conduct rules that prohibit openly practicing in an MDP); App. C, supra note 3
(noting that “from an historical perspective the prohibitions against a lawyer sharing legal fees or
entering into a partnership with a nonlawyer are inextricably linked with the adoption and
enforcement of UPL statutes.”).
125. See Morello, supra note 43, at 203; Hoberman, supra note 2; see also Conley, ABA
Takes on MDP, supra note 104 (“Multidisciplinary partnering has been prohibited by all 50 states
since 1969 though in the District of Columbia nonlawyer partners are allowed in firms devoted
solely to practicing law.”)
126. See App. C, supra note 3.
127. See Background Paper, supra note 9 (“The prohibition against MDPs is rooted in the
perception that it prevents a layperson from exercising undue influence over the independence of
a lawyer in the representation of a client in attempt to subordinate the protection of clients to the
pursuit of profit.”); Morello, supra note 43, at 236. (“Jurisdictions adopted restrictive rules
governing law firm ownership and MDPs to preserve the independent judgment of lawyers by
preventing nonlawyer influences on members of the bar.”); Mullerat, supra note 3.
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commentators have suggested some supplementary functions for the rules of
professional conduct. For instance, some suggest that in addition to protecting
an attorney’s independent judgment, the rules of professional conduct were
implemented to safeguard attorneys’ economic interest by preventing
nonattorneys from taking work away from attorneys.128 Another commentator
notes the rules were designed to prohibit nonattorneys from improperly
soliciting clients and engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.129
Although nothing in the Model Rules prevents an attorney from working
with a nonattorney to solve a client’s problem, the Model Rules do prohibit
“an integrated practice in which a lawyer shares fees with a nonlawyer or
enters into a partnership or an analogous relationship with a nonlawyer to
deliver legal services to clients.”130 In other words, the Model Rules prohibit
multidisciplinary practices under the definition adopted by the Commission.131
Ultimately, MDPs have the potential to affect many existing rules. Arguments
for and against amending these rules have been promulgated.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST CHANGING THE RULES
A.

Arguments for Changing the Rules
1. The Rules Need to Reflect the Reality of the Current Marketplace

Critics of the current rules emphasize that the rules do not reflect the
current economic and social reality facing clients.132 They argue that the rules
do not accommodate the present marketplace with its needs and demands for
MDPs.133 The argument is that “[a]s the economy changes, so should the rules

(“Independence is the quintessence of the profession. All other ethical duties of the lawyer
directly emanate from the primordial right and duty of independence and find their efficient cause
in the need to protect such independence.”).
128. See Morello, supra note 43, at 236.
129. See David Hricik, Multidisciplinary Partnerships Cause for Concern, TEX. LAW., Nov.
1, 1999 at 24.
130. Background Paper, supra note 9:
A lawyer may directly employ such a professional on the lawyer’s staff, retain an
unaffiliated professional with the client’s consent, or assist a professional who is
separately retained by a client. A lawyer may also own a company employing a
professional or offering certain products created by the nonlawyer professional.
Id.
131. See App. C, supra note 3.
132. See, e.g., Written Remarks of Tucker, supra note 116; discussion supra Part II.B.4.
133. See discussion supra Part II.B.4.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

652

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:629

governing the provision of legal services.”134 If the legal profession refuses to
accommodate the present market, its progression will be stunted.135
Currently, attorneys have a monopoly over legal services.136 Critics view
the ability of attorneys to dominate the market as an “anti-competitive guild
rule.”137 They argue that modification of the rules can provide new and better
services to clients.138 Not only will competition decrease the prices
consumers’ pay for legal services, it will also increase the types of services
available.139
2. Clients Need and Demand MDPs
Another argument advanced is that since the legal profession’s top priority
is client service, the ABA’s primary goal should be finding improved ways for
the legal profession to serve the public.140 This being the case, proponents of
MDPs claim a client will benefit greatly from organizations that can handle all
of the legal and nonlegal issues involved in a client’s problem or situation.141
Not only will MDPs provide more options and services to clients,142 they
will also allow clients to obtain solutions more efficiently and conveniently.143
Moreover, proponents claim MDPs will allow attorneys to produce work more
efficiently and they will thereby be able to provide services to clients at a
lower cost.144 Furthermore, critics of the current rules claim that clients should

134. Doug Bandow, Editorial, Lawyers Need to Evolve With the Economy, J. COMMERCE,
Aug. 13, 1999, at 9, available in 1999 WL 6382138.
135. See Written Remarks of Tucker, supra note 116; Statement of Kathryn A. Oberly Vice
Chair and General Counsel, Ernst & Young LLP ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(visited Oct. 18, 1999) http://www.abanet.org/cpr/oberly1.html; see also John S. Dzienkowski &
Robert J. Peroni, Proposal on MDPs Goes Overboard, TEX. LAW., Aug. 9, 1999, at 38 (noting
that “[p]articipating in the global marketplace is not just a goal for most corporations, but rather a
necessary economic reality.”).
136. See Background Paper, supra note 9.
137. E.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 135. See also, e.g., Jeff Blumenthal & April
White, To MDP or Not to MDP?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 27, 1999, at 1 (reporting that
Ward Bower, principal of Altman Weil Inc., argues that resistance to MDPs will cause lawyers to
be seen as economic protectionists); Lafferty, supra note 114 (“While other nations are meeting
consumer demands for one-stop shopping by allowing law firms to hire professional accountants
and financial analysts, American law firms are forced to adhere to rules better suited for the trade
guilds of the 19th century.”).
138. See, e.g., Bandow, supra note 134; discussion supra Part II.B.4.
139. See Morello, supra note 43, at 240.
140. See Weber, supra note 114.
141. See Morello, supra note 43, at 239; discussion supra Part II.B.4.
142. See Weber, supra note 114.
143. See Morello, supra note 43, at 239.
144. See Hoberman, supra note 2; see also Morello, supra note 43, at 239. “The proponents
argue that MDPs cause clients to need only one firm and, thus, reduce clients’ costs because there
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have the ability to choose the best type of firm to solve their problems.145 The
only choice the rules currently provide for is a law firm.146
Critics also argue that MDPs are necessary because clients are currently
receiving bad advice from nonlegal professionals who do not have access to
lawyers.147 They believe that if attorneys and nonattorneys were allowed to

is only one company to instruct, communication between members of the same firm is better,
there is a better liaison between advisors and projects are streamlined.” Id. (footnote omitted).
But see id. at 241:
Opponents to MDPs argue that if the U.S. legal services market was opened to MDP the
Big Six would immediately dominate because of their advantage in size, diversity,
resources and client base . . . . The opponents argue that the resulting Big Six MDPs’
oligopoly would undermine any efficiency gained from economies of scale . . . and thus,
lead to fee increases.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
145. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 114 (noting that “[f]rom the consumer perspective, there is
one basic issue: choice. Consumers want choices, whether it is the brand of potato chips they
buy, the Internet service provider they select for their home computer or where they go for
professional services.”); Testimony of Laurel S. Terry, Professor, Penn State Dickinson School of
Law Before the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (visited Jan. 6, 2000)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/terryremarks.html> [hereinafter Testimony of Terry] (noting that
while she is not sure attorneys in MDPs will honor their ethical obligations, she could not bring
herself to override client choice on that basis).
146. See Weber, supra note 114. But see Mullerat, supra note 3:
Clients should be guaranteed a genuinely free choice of legal advisor. Clients’ free
choice would be jeopardized by MDPs marketing “packaged services.” Were MDPs to
be permitted, the trend would undoubtedly be towards the MDP endeavoring to
monopolize legal and financial advice as well as the auditing of a given client
(particularly in Continental Europe where there are few large law firms). This may
eventually place the client in a state of dependency on the MDP, especially if the
“package” includes auditing. Besides, changing auditors is a most serious move, apt to
alarm creditors.
Id. According to Lawrence J. Fox:
A client hires a lawyer at the Big 5. The lawyer performs services for eighteen months.
The client is now told the auditing firm is taking on the client’s adverse party in a (let us
hope) unrelated matter. What is the choice? The client can accept the fact that its multidisciplinary provider is working for the other side and worry how many punches will be
pulled to assure that the new offending representation stays put. Or the client can fire the
Big 5 firm, waste the fees, time and learning curve the firm provided, and look for another
firm to represent the client. The only choice presented is the one our friend Hobson was
given.
Written Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox (visited Jan. 6, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/fox1.
html>.
147. See, e.g., Regulation of Bar: N.Y. City Bar’s Conception of MDPs Would Prevent Firms’
Auditing Work, 15 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 373, Aug. 4, 1999 (comment by
Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
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practice together, clients would not be facing these problems.148 Although
nothing prevents an attorney from working with other professionals to solve a
client’s problem, critics do not think clients can achieve the benefits of an
MDP by hiring different professionals to work with an attorney.149 In fact,
critics of the current rules point out that many professionals refuse to be
employed by attorneys because they feel it devalues the services they provide
and prevents them from sharing in valuable profits.150 Ultimately, pro-MDP
commentators are not the only ones who foresee the benefits MDPs may have
for clients. The potential clients of MDPs, both individual and corporate, are
expressing support and demand for relaxing the rules to allow MDPs.151
3. MDPs Will Not Harm Clients
Critics of the current rules argue that changing the rules to allow MDPs
will not harm clients as long as they understand the facts involved.152 At least
one commentator argues that instead of changing Model Rule 1.6153
(confidentiality) the issues simply need to be disclosed to the client so the
client can decide whether to consent.154 The same argument is advanced with
respect to conflicts of interest.155 Critics believe that if clients are willing to
waive conflict and confidentiality issues, the current professional conduct rules
148. See id. According to a New York Bar Committee, “[a] significant number of
lawsuits . . . could have been prevented if the right ‘professional team’ had been consulted or
involved at the outset.” Id.
149. See Background Paper, supra note 9.
150. See id.
151. See Report, supra note 3.
152. See, e.g., Written Remarks of Tucker, supra note 116.
153. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). Model Rule 1.6 reads as
follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the
client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond
to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client.
Id.
154. See Written Remarks of Tucker, supra note 116 (noting that “[t]oo many of our problems
with clients are not attributable to perceived breaches of the protection of client confidentiality or
conflict of interest, but, rather, to failures of communication, whether due to incompetence, lack
of promptness, lack of diligence or just plain arrogance, or any combination of the same.”).
155. See id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES

655

are not protecting clients, rather, the rules are impeding clients’ ability to
choose a firm.156
Critics of the current rules also argue that perceived conflicts of interest
are already difficult to avoid in this “multi-jurisdictional world.”157 For
instance, a law firm with offices around the world may not be aware of the
business conducted in its affiliated offices.158 Likewise, with respect to the
claim that the rules are needed to safeguard attorneys’ independent
professional judgment, critics of the rules believe attorneys are already forced
to compromise their professional judgment.159 They argue that contingent
fees, success bonuses, interests in clients’ entities in exchange for services,
preferential acquisition opportunities or preferential terms in acquiring such
interest all pose more serious threats to an attorney’s independent judgment
than changing the rules to allow MDPs.160
156. See id.; see also Bandow, supra note 134:
There is also concern about variations in professional rules governing confidentiality,
conflicts of interest, and attorney-client privilege. But these could all be worked through.
In some, the actual requirements could apply to individual attorneys. In others, such as
handling conflicts, clients could be informed and allowed to accept or forgo
representation.
Id.
157. E.g., Written Remarks of Tucker, supra note 116.
158. See id.
159. See, e.g., id. See also, e.g., Eleanor W. Myers, Multidisciplinary Practice Debate
Continues, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 12, 1999, at 11 (According to the comments of Peter
Glenn, Dean of Dickinson Law School, “[t]he stresses on lawyer independence are clearly
present today in many law practices.”); Updated Background Report, supra note 37 (indicating
interferences with attorneys’ independent judgment already exist).
160. See, e.g., Written remarks of Tucker, supra note 116. There are various practicies that
potentially impair an attorney’s independent professional judgment. For example:
We hear stories of lawyers working inhumane hours, sharply rising levels of professional
dissatisfaction and burnout. Lawyer compensation hinges on business personally
generated for the firm over all other measures of productivity. Discussions abound on the
importance of marketing your firm, running your firm with strong management and
developing efficient systems, pro-active competitive strategies and leadership. To suggest
that today’s law practice operates free of the influence of profit flies in the face of every
recent trend . . . . The stresses on lawyer independence are clearly present today in many
law practices.
Myers, supra note 159. Moreover, the MDP Comm’n recently noted:
The most common concern expressed about MDPs is that working in such a practice
setting will inevitably lead to the erosion of a lawyer’s professional independence. This
concern is highly selective, however. It ignores other practice settings in which the
problem is more frequent and may be more severe. Among these settings are full time
employment by a single client (e.g., in-house corporate counsel, lawyers employed by a
union providing services directly to union members, and lawyers employed by a legal
services organization under the direction of a nonlawyer board), employment as an
associate under the direction of a partner (see Rule 5.2, allowing a subordinate lawyer to
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Furthermore, at least one commentator notes that attorneys will act
ethically even if they are working with non-attorneys.161 MDPs do not
eliminate an attorney’s ethical duties,162 and based on testimony heard by the
Commission about places where MDPs are currently operating, no evidence
exists to indicate MDPs will affect the core values of the legal profession.163
4. Other Professions Have Ethical Rules and Concerns
Critics of the current rules claim attorneys are not the only profession with
a long and honorable tradition of values and ethics.164 At least one
commentator points out that almost every profession has concerns about
“integrity, public service, deceptive advertising, self-dealing, and the
like . . . .”165 For example, critics point out that under the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants Rules of Conduct (“AICPA Rules”), Certified
Public Accountants (“CPAs”), like attorneys, must protect client
confidences.166 A CPA who violates this principle faces disciplinary action as
well as liability for damages caused by the disclosure.167 Similarly, critics of
the rules point out that CPAs, like attorneys, are required to maintain integrity
and guard against conflicts of interests under the AICPA Rules.168 Some
take direction from a supervisory lawyer regarding difficult ethical issues), and
membership in a partnership in which difficult ethical issues are frequently resolved by a
managing partner or an executive committee and in which compensation is dependent on
billings (e.g., whether to take a new matter in the face of a possible conflict of interest or
to disclose alleged client fraud).
Updated Background Report, supra note 37.
161. See Edmon, supra note 92, at 15.
162. See Bandow, supra note 134.
163. See Testimony of Terry, supra note 145 (citing testimony from Gerard Nicolay, Thomas
Verhoeven, Neil Cochran (all of whom practice in an MDP) and Allison Crawley, Michel Gout,
Andrew Scott, and Gerard Mazet (all of whom are regulators or bar advisors in countries with
MDPs)).
164. See, e.g., Regulation of Bar: N.Y. City Bar’s Conception of MDPs Would Prevent Firms’
Auditing Work, supra note 147 (noting a suggestion by the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York).
165. Id. (comment by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
166. See, e.g., Turman, supra note 13. See also AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS Rule 301 (1978) [hereinafter AICPA]. Under AICPA Rule 301, a CPA “shall not
disclose any confidential information obtained in the course of a professional engagement except
with the consent of the client.” Id.
167. See Turman, supra note 13 (“Not only do state accountancy laws make it illegal for
accountants to disclose certain information, but . . . the Internal Revenue Code now provides
criminal penalties for improper disclosures.”).
168. See, e.g., Turman, supra note 13. See also AICPA Rule 102 (requiring CPAs to
maintain objectivity and integrity). “[T]he rule [AICPA 102] expresses that conflicts of interest
can be created if a CPA or his firm has a relationship with another client that the client would
view as an impairment to objectivity.” Turman, supra note 13.
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critics assert that the only difference between the AICPA Rules and the ABA
Model Rules is that the former provides that the client can waive such
conflicts.169
B.

Arguments Against Changing the Rules
1. The Current Rules are Deeply Rooted in History

Those who oppose modifying existing rules claim that the legal profession
and its bans against MDPs are deeply rooted in the history of the United
States.170 According to opponents, the tradition and history of the legal
profession’s ethics rules and obligations are what make the legal profession
unique.171 Thus, any modification of the rules to permit MDPs will result in
“the end of the legal profession as it now exists.”172 At least one opponent
believes that relaxing the rules will trivialize lawyers’ ethical obligations.173
Additionally, opponents point out that MDPs are not as difficult to implement
in Europe because Europe’s legal ethics rules are more relaxed174 and have a
completely different history.175 For instance, Europe’s civil law system is not
founded on advocacy or the unauthorized practice of law, both of which are
central features of the United States’ legal system.176 As one commentator

169. See, e.g., Turman, supra note 13.
170. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 50; Baker, supra note 9. See also Bacon, supra note 96,
at 2:
The law as we know it today evolved slowly in Anglo Saxon culture, from the Magna
Carta and religious canons to the common law that English colonists imported into this
country. As the law developed so did the lawyer. And although the law and the practice
of law have changed in many ways, certain hallmarks have remained unshakable—the
twin duties of client loyalty and confidentiality, and the conflicts of interest that grew out
of those duties.
Id.
171. See, e.g., Mullerat, supra note 3; infra note 172.
172. Baker, supra note 9. See also Mullerat, supra note 3 (noting that “[i]f such duties were
to be abandoned or unduly relaxed, the legal profession would become a mere business, an honest
business perhaps, but it would cease to be a profession.”); Written Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox,
supra note 146 (noting that if the rules are amended to allow MDPs, the legal profession will lose
both “its independence and its soul.”).
173. See Written Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox, supra note 146.
174. See, e.g., Bacon, supra note 96, at 2.
175. See, e.g., Regulation of Bar: ABA Refuses to Change Ethics Rules Unless Studies of
MDPs Dispel Concerns, 15 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 396, Aug. 18, 1999
(comment by Leslie W. Jacobs).
176. See id. (comment by Leslie W. Jacobs).
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notes, just because MDPs are appropriate or acceptable in Europe does not
mean they are appropriate or acceptable for the United States.177
2. Differences Between the Professions
a. Different Ethics Rules Governing the Different Professions
Opponents to MDPs claim that MDPs will have severe consequences due
to the differences between the ethical rules of other professions and the legal
profession’s ethics rules. While CPAs or members of other professions may
have rules regarding client confidentiality and conflicts of interest, the
interpretation given to these common terms differs considerably from the legal
profession’s interpretation.178 For instance, there is no uniformity among the
professions regarding client confidentiality or the “circumstances under which
client information may, must or must not be disclosed to a third party.”179
Even more troubling, according to MDP opponents, is the fact that the
Model Rules often come into direct conflict with the conduct rules of other
professions.180 For example, the Model Rules provide for the attorney-client
privilege, whereas an accountant has a duty to provide full disclosure to the
public.181
Moreover, although accountants have rules regarding
confidentiality,182 one commentator believes that the “duties of disclosure with
respect to certified financial statements would override any duty to keep

177. See Regulation of the Bar: Before the Vote, MDP Commission Already Knew it has a
Difficult Task, supra note 118 (comment by John Kouris appearing before the MDP Comm’n on
behalf of the Defense Research Institute).
178. See Salch, supra note 3, ¶ 507, at 5-31. An examination of the ethical rules of attorneys
versus the ethical rules of CPAs:
[D]emonstrates that there are differences, including differences in the meaning or
interpretation given to common terms, like conflict of interest and maintaining
confidentiality, and differences in the approach to non-professional ownership of
professional firms . . . . Thus, to those who would argue that lawyers and accountants are
“the same,” “on a par,” or “equal,” I would respond, “No, they are different, and we
should carefully guard and maintain those differences lest both professions lose their
historic, public role, and public trust.”
Id.
179. Report, supra note 3.
180. See Edmon, supra note 92, at 12.
181. See id.; Cearley, supra note 2; see also Anna Snider, NYC Bar Panel Bar Give MDP
Conditional Approval, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., July 23, 1999, available in Lexis, News
Group File, All (reporting that the New York City Bar’s primary objection to the MDP
Comm’n’s recommendation is the “irreconcilable difference” between the attorneys ethics rules
regarding client confidentiality and the public disclosure obligations of accountants).
182. See supra note 166.
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material confidential.”183 Furthermore, while attorneys have a duty to act as
advocates, accountants have a duty to objectively analyze information.184
With respect to conflict rules, attorneys are prohibited from representing
clients with competing interests, whereas accountants can represent clients
with adverse interests.185
Additionally, opponents point out that while a court cannot force attorneys
to testify about clients and their confidences, a court can require other
professionals to provide such testimony.186 No matter what a client tells an
attorney in confidence, the client does not have to worry about the information
coming out in the courtroom.187 There is no guarantee that a court will extend
the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine to those outside of
the legal profession.188
b. Problems Imposing the Model Rules on Other Professionals
Opponents to MDPs point out many potential problems associated with
imposing the legal profession’s ethics rules on other professionals. For
example, opponents do not think nonattorneys will ever agree to be bound by
the strict ethical rules of attorneys.189 Moreover, even if nonattorneys do agree
to be bound by legal ethical rules, evidence indicating that the Big Five have
encountered problems complying with their own conflict of interest rules
already exists.190 According to one opponent, nonattorneys will fail to
appreciate the legal profession’s ethics rules if for no other reason than they

183. Written Materials of Linda Galler, Hofstra University (visited Jan. 6, 1999) <http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/galler.html>.
184. See Cearley, supra note 2.
185. See id.
186. See Paskind, supra note 50.
187. See Flynn, supra note 4.
188. See Snider, supra note 181 (comment by Association of the Bar of the City of New York
executive committee).
189. See Edmon, supra note 92, at 12; see also Mullerat, supra note 3 (“No convincing
argument has been put forward to sustain the notion that ‘non-lawyers’, who will control the
MDP, will abide readily, or without substantial friction, by the lawyers’ stringent rules regarding
criminal matters related to the provision of their services.”).
190. See, e.g., Karen D. Powell’s Response to MDP Report (visited Sept. 23, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/powell.html>. Recently, the media reported that the Securities
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought an action against PricewaterhouseCoopers alleging
conflicts of interest. According to reports, PricewaterhouseCoopers allegedly failed to comply
with SEC regulations forbidding “the firm or its partners from participating in audits of publicly
traded companies in which they also hold a financial interest.” Id. See also, e.g., Mullerat, supra
note 3 (“Law firms, especially multinational law firms, are already facing serious difficulties in
dealing with conflicts of interests[.] MDPs, with their conflicting services, would make this
problem intolerable.”).
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simply do not understand them.191 Other opponents find it difficult to ask
nonattorneys to follow the same strict standards as attorneys.192
c. Attorneys’ Pro Bono Commitment
According to MDP opponents, MDPs may have a negative impact on
attorneys’ pro bono commitments. Opponents to MDPs point out that the legal
profession has traditionally maintained a strong commitment to pro bono
work.193 Although the Model Rules do not require attorneys to perform pro
bono services, they do indicate that an attorney should provide such
services.194 Since other professions do not have the same commitment to pro
bono and public services, MDPs could decrease the scope and range of such
services currently provided by attorneys.195
191. See Statement of the Defense Research Institute on Commission Proposal for
Facilitating Multidisciplinary Practice (visited Jan. 6, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
dri.html> [hereinafter Statement of DRI] (noting “[n]on-lawyer managers of litigation often times
disregard important canons relating to client confidences and the independent exercise of
professional judgment. Probably innocently, they simply do not understand the rules that govern
our conduct.”).
192. See, e.g., Mullerat, supra note 3; see also, e.g., Lafferty, supra note 114 (claiming that
“the imposition of lawyers’ rules on other highly qualified professionals, who don’t happen to be
lawyers, smacks of arrogance. Lawyers would do well to ponder whether this type of arrogance
is a contributing factor in repeated opinion polls that show lawyers generally are held in low self
esteem.”).
193. See Edmon, supra note 92, at 12.
194. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983) (“A lawyer should
aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono public services per year.”); Written Remarks of
Judge Judith Billings Submitted to the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (visited Jan. 6,
2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/billings1.html>. See also id.:
Every state has some provision in its rules of professional conduct focusing on the
responsibility of each lawyer to provide pro bono public service. 37 states have rules
identical or similar to either the current version of ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 6.1 (adopted in 1993) or the 1983 version of the rule.
Id.
195. See Edmon, supra note 92, at 12 (noting “pro bono services, volunteer services for the
organized bar, MCLE courses, and public education about the legal system will all suffer.”); see
also Gary Spencer, State Bar Leader Sees Threat to Profession’s ‘Core Values’, N.Y.L.J., June
21, 1999, at 1 (demonstrating that some opponents (e.g., Thomas O. Rice, the New York State
Bar Association President) will go so far as to say attorneys have a duty to perform pro bono
work and public services). But see Report, supra note 3 (According to the MDP Comm’n, under
its recommendation, lawyers in an MDP should be required to fulfill their pro bono commitment
in the same way as is required of an attorney in a traditional law firm.); The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, supra note 33 (noting that “[w]ays will have to be found to
encourage pro bono service and activities to improve the legal system by lawyers in MDPs (a
problem faced already by many government and in-house corporate attorneys and by a
distressingly large and growing number of lawyers in private practice.)”); Written Remarks of
Judge Judith Billings, supra note 194 (noting that lawyers in various corporate departments have
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3. The Current Rules Protect the Core Values
Those who oppose MDPs generally feel the current rules are necessary to
protect the core values of the legal profession.196 For instance, they believe
that MDPs will impair an attorney’s independent judgment due to influence by
personal interests and external pressure.197 Ultimately, the argument is that an
attorney’s judgment should be free from influence by clients, courts and third
parties.198 Opponents claim that such advice will be impossible to obtain in an
MDP since clients will not be able to receive independent advice free from
business considerations.199 Others suggest that attorneys may feel pressure to
refer clients to nonlawyers in the partnership, even if a professional outside of
the partnership is better suited to a client’s needs.200 Additionally, MDPs may
encourage attorneys to cross-sell services that the client really does not
need.201
Opponents also point out that the attorney-client privilege may be
impaired if the rules are amended to allow MDPs.202 The duties of other
professionals regarding this privilege may not be as important or emphasized
as strongly as it is for attorneys, and opponents fear that the attorney-client
privilege will be diluted if the client is not informed about the activities of the
MDP and the potential implications of representation by an MDP.203
Additionally, there are no guarantees that clients, even if informed, will
been participating in pro bono services and there is a growing movement in such departments to
contribute such services. Accordingly, many have benefited from corporate counsels’
contributions.). Judge Billings further remarks:
These benefits have been achieved in the corporate counsel environment because
individual lawyers have committed themselves to fulfilling professional responsibility to
engage in pro bono service, and their employers have been willing to support these
efforts. This same result can and should be achieved in the context of multidisciplinary
practices.
Id.
196. See Background Paper, supra note 9; Baker, supra note 9; Edmon, supra note 92, at 11.
197. See, e.g., Mullerat, supra note 3; Statement of DRI, supra note 191. In response to the
MDP Comm’n’s statement that “[i]n today’s world, many lawyers routinely work a [sic] practice
settings in which they are subject to management oversight by non-lawyers . . . . Independence
has been maintained in those settings,” the Defense Research Institute claims that “[t]o the
contrary, professional independence of judgment has in fact been severely impacted in some of
those settings. Defense lawyers have experienced numerous instances of non-lawyers hindering
their representation of clients.” Id.
198. See Mullerat, supra note 3.
199. See, e.g., Patricia Manson, ABA Puts Off Vote on Eased Practice Rule, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Aug. 10, 1999, at 1.
200. See Goodman, supra note 34.
201. See Conley, ABA Takes on MDP, supra note 104 (comment by Bruce H. Gaynes).
202. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
203. See Snider, supra note 181.
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understand that a lawyer and nonlawyer in an MDP have different
responsibilities relating to client information and confidentiality.204
IV. THE COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATION
According to the Commission, “it is possible to satisfy the interests of
clients and lawyers by providing the option of an MDP without compromising
the core values of the legal profession that are essential for the protection of
clients and the proper maintenance of the client-lawyer relationship.”205 To
achieve this result, the Commission recommended that any amendments to the
Model Rules be consistent with fifteen principles.206
First, the Commission recommended that “[t]he legal profession . . . adopt
and maintain rules of professional conduct that protect its core values . . ., but
should not permit existing rules to unnecessarily inhibit the development of
new structures for the more effective delivery of services and better public
access to the legal system.”207 Accordingly, the Commission recommended
that attorneys be able to deliver “legal services”208 through an MDP as defined
by the Commission.209
The Commission further recommended that the rules be modified to permit
fee sharing between attorneys and nonattorneys subject to certain safeguards
designed to protect the core values of the legal profession.210 An attorney,
however, “should not be permitted to share fees with a nonlawyer if any
activities of the partnership or other entity consist of the practice of law except
that a lawyer in an MDP . . .” controlled by attorneys or nonattorneys should
be permitted to do so subject to certain safeguards.211 Additionally,

204. See Mullerat, supra note 3 (noting that clients “would be confused because they would
not understand if they are giving their information to a lawyer to be defended or to an accountant
to be evaluated.”); Oral Testimony of Jay G. Foonberg, Feb. 1999 (visited Jan. 6, 2000)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/Foonberg.html> (noting that “[h]e is concerned that the person
seeking waiver from clients on conflicts may have no legal training.”).
205. General Information Form, supra note 7.
206. See Recommendation, supra note 3.
207. Id. (listing independence of professional judgment, protection of confidential client
information, and loyalty to the client through avoidance of conflicts of interest as the core values
of the legal profession); see also Updated Background Report, supra note 37 (noting that in all
future reports and recommendations, competency will be included as a core value of the legal
profession).
208. See App. A, supra note 3. “‘Legal services’ denote those services which, if provided by
a lawyer engaged in the practice of law, would be regarded as part of such practice of law for
purposes of application of the rules of professional conduct.” Id.
209. Recommendation, supra note 3.
210. See id.
211. Id; see also App. C, supra note 3 (noting that the purpose of prohibiting fee sharing and
partnership except in an MDP, is to protect professional independence of judgment. “‘Finder’s
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“[a]llowing fee-sharing and ownership interest in an MDP does not change the
rules of professional conduct prohibiting fee-sharing and partnership in any
other respect, including the current provisions limiting the holding of equity
investments in any entity or organization providing legal services.”212
Although the Commission proposed that a lawyer should be able to deliver
legal services through an MDP, the Commission recommended that
nonattorneys be strictly prohibited from delivering legal services.213
Following this recommendation, the professional rules of conduct would still
apply to an attorney in an MDP,214 even if the attorney were to act under a
nonattorney supervisor.215
Moreover, under the recommendation, all rules that apply to a law firm
should apply equally to MDPs.216 For purposes of conflict of interest and
imputation rules, all clients of an MDP are treated as clients of the attorney.217
In addition, “[t]o the extent that the delivery of nonlegal services to a client is
fees’ to third parties, ‘ambulance chasing,’ and the like would remain barred.”); Updated
Background Report, supra note 37. The MDP Comm’n’s decision to include both attorney and
nonattorney-owned MDPs:
[R]ested upon the conviction that the ABA should expand the opportunities for client
choice as much as possible, consistent with the protection of the legal profession’s core
values . . . . In addition, the Commission viewed allowing nonlawyer controlled MDP’s
as the most effective way of properly bringing those lawyers currently working at
professional service firms under the legal profession’s regulatory umbrella.
Id.
212. Recommendation, supra note 3. See also Updated Background Report, supra note 37:
The Commission’s decision to continue the present prohibition on equity investments
rested primarily on two considerations. First, the Commission was concerned that equity
investment could pose a particular threat to lawyer independence of professional
judgment. The Commission was concerned that equity investors would be more
interested in the bottom line rather than in service. Second, the Commission was well
aware that the House of Delegates had previously rejected a proposal to permit passive
investment and agreed with that decision. The Commission did not consider lifting the
ban at this time to be a necessary step to accomplish the goal of best serving the public
through the relaxation of the rules that currently prevent multidisciplinary practice.
Id: see also id. (noting the MDP Comm’n is willing to consider “well documented comments . . .
indicating that the continuation of the ban would have a deleterious economic impact . . . . “).
213. See Recommendation, supra note 3. See also Report, supra note 3. (emphasizing that
the MDP Comm’n was not recommending nonattorneys be permitted to deliver legal services,
rather, the purpose of the recommendation was to allow attorneys to practice in a wider variety of
settings).
214. See Recommendation, supra note 3.
215. See id; see also App. C, supra note 3 (noting that the purpose of the principle is to ensure
that an attorney’s indpendent judgment is not weakened); Report, supra note 3 (same).
216. See Recommendation, supra note 3; see also App. C, supra note 3 (noting that the
purpose of this principle is to ensure an attorney’s independent judgment is not weakened).
217. See Recommendation, supra note 3; see also App. C, supra note 3 (noting that the
purpose of this principle is to protect the core value of loyalty to the client).
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compatible with the delivery of legal services to the same client and with the
rules of professional conduct . . . [,]” attorneys are required to make a
“reasonable effort” to ensure that clients understand the difference between
attorneys’ and nonattorneys’ obligations regarding the disclosure of
confidential information.218 An attorney must make a “reasonable effort” to
ensure that clients understand that courts may treat these respective obligations
accordingly.219
The Commission further recommended that attorneys who work with, or
are assisted by, nonattorneys in an MDP be required to make “reasonable
efforts” to ensure the MDP enacts measures that make the conduct of
nonattorneys compatible with the professional obligations of attorneys.220
According to the Commission, services that would constitute the “practice of
law,”221 if provided by a lawyer in a law firm, must be represented as such by
an MDP.222
218. See Recommendation, supra note 3.
219. See id.; see also App. C, supra note 3 (noting that the MDP Comm’n believes that such
disclosure and understanding will adequately protect the attorney-client privilege); Updated
Background Report, supra note 37 (noting that the MDP Comm’n takes the position that the role
of auditor and attorney are incompatible under federal securities law).
220. Recommendation, supra note 3. See also App. C, supra note 3 (noting that the purpose
of this provision is to protect the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality).
221. See App. A, supra note 3:
“Practice of Law” means the provision of professional legal advice or services where
there is a client relationship or trust or reliance. One is presumed to be practicing law
when engaging in any of the following conduct on behalf of another:
(a) Preparing any legal document, including any deeds, mortgages, assignments,
discharges, leases, trust instruments or any other instruments intended to affect
the disposition of personal property, wills, codicils, instruments intended to
affect the disposition of property of decedents’ estates, documents relating to
business and corporate transactions, other instruments intended to affect or
secure legal rights, and contracts except routine agreements incidental to a
regular course of business;
(b) Preparing or expressing legal opinions;
(c) Appearing or acting as an attorney in any tribunal;
(d) Preparing any claims, demands or pleadings of any kind, or any written
documents containing legal argument or interpretation of law, for filing in any
court, administrative agency or other tribunal;
(e) Providing advice or counsel as to how any of the activities described in
subparagraph (a) through (d) might be done, or whether they were done, in
accordance with applicable law;
(f) Furnishing an attorney or attorneys, or other persons, to render the services
described in subparagraphs (a) through (e) above.
Id.
222. Recommendation, supra note 3. See also Report, supra note 3 (noting that the purpose
of this principle is to guarantee that the protections offered clients are not lost by regulating the
manner in which the lawyer is identified to clients).
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Finally, the Commission recommended that nonattorney operated MDPs
be subject to the authority of the highest court in each state in which the MDP
is operating and be required to submit a written undertaking to that court.223
Failure to comply with the written undertaking requirement will subject the

223. See Recommendation, supra note 3. A chief executive officer (or similar official) and
the board of directors (or similar body) must sign the written undertaking. Id. Moreover, the
written undertaking must contain the following:
(A) it will not directly or indirectly interfere with a lawyer’s exercise of independent
professional judgment on behalf of a client;
(B) it will establish, maintain and enforce procedures designed to protect a lawyer’s
exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a client from interference by
the MDP, any member of the MDP, or any person or entity controlled by the MDP;
(C) it will establish, maintain and enforce procedures to protect a lawyer’s professional
obligation to segregate client funds;
(D) the members of the MDP delivering or assisting in the delivery of legal services will
abide by the rules of professional conduct;
(E) it will respect the unique role of the lawyer in society as an officer of the legal system,
a representative of clients and a public citizen having special responsibility for the
administration of justice. This undertaking should acknowledge that lawyers in an MDP
have the same special obligation to render voluntary pro bono publico legal service as
lawyers practicing solo or in law firms;
(F) it will annually review the procedures established in subsection (B) and amend them
as needed to ensure their effectiveness; and annually certify its compliance with
subsections (A)-(F) and provide a copy of the certification to each lawyer in the MDP;
(G) it will annually file a signed and verified copy of the certificate described in
subsection (F) with the court, along with relevant information about each lawyer who is a
member of the MDP;
(H) it will permit the court to review and conduct an administrative audit of the MDP, as
each such authority deems appropriate, to determine and assure compliance with
subsections (A)-(G); and
(I) it will bear the cost of the administrative audit of MDPs described in subparagraph (H)
through the payment of an annual certification fee.
Id. See also App. A, supra note 3 (noting that “‘[m]ember’ of an MDP denotes any employee,
partner, shareholder, or the like to the extent permitted of lawyers organized in law firms.”).
According to the Comm’n on MDP, “[t]hese undertakings are directed toward MDPs that are
controlled by nonlawyers because the commission believes that it is unnecessary to require MDPs
under the control of lawyers to comply with the safeguard certification process since lawyers’
duties under the rules of professional conduct already provide those protections.” Report, supra
note 3. Moreover:
[T]he Commission considers that the certification process, the filing procedures and the
payment of the annual fee are reasonable measures designed to protect MDP’s clients and
the public from possible interference with the client-lawyer relationship by nonlawyers in
an MDP. Because the likelihood of such interference is significantly diminished if
lawyers control the MDP, the undertakings set forth in Recommendation (A)-(I) are not
required of an MDP in which control is exercised by lawyers.
App. C, supra note 3.
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MDP to the withdrawal of its ability to deliver legal services and any other
remedial measures that a court feels is appropriate.224
In an attempt to ensure the formal recommendation is carried out, the
Commission proposed Model Rule 5.8, “Responsibilities of a Lawyer in a
Multidisciplinary Practice.” 225 It “delineates some of the duties, controls and
safeguards discussed in the formal recommendation.”226 At the same time,
however, Model Rule 5.8 was offered for illustrative purposes and was
intended only as one example “of how the principles in the Commission’s
recommendation might be implemented.”227 Ultimately, the Commission was
only asking the House to approve the recommendation consisting of the
aforementioned principles.228
In compliance with the aforementioned principles and Model Rule 5.8, the
Commission proposed an amendment to Model Rule 5.4229 which would
permit fee sharing in MDPs.230 The Commission also proposed limited
amendments to Model Rule 1.6231 (confidentiality), Model Rule 1.10232

224. See Recommendation, supra note 3.
225. See Regulation of Bar: ABA Multidisciplinary Practice Commission Recommends
Amending Rules to Allow MDPs, 15 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 250, July 9, 1999;
supra note 8.
226. Regulation of Bar: ABA Multidisciplinary Practice Commission Recommends Amending
Rules to Allow MDPs, supra note 225.
227. App. C, supra note 3.
228. See id.
229. See App. A, supra note 3. Under the MDP Comm’n’s proposal the following subsection
would be added to Model Rule 5.4: “(e) To the extent provided in Rule 5.8, the provisions in
subsections (a), (b), or (d) above do not apply to a lawyer in an MDP.” Id.
230. See Regulation of Bar: ABA Multidisciplinary Practice Commission Recommends
Amending Rules to Allow MDPs, supra note 225; App. A, supra note 3.
231. See App. A, supra note 3. Under the MDP Comm’n’s proposal, the following additions
would be made to Rule 1.6, “Confidentiality of Information”:
[23] A lawyer in an MDP who provides legal services to the MDP’s clients may
encounter confidentiality problems that require special attention. The lawyer should
scrupulously observe the rules of professional conduct relating to the protection of
confidential client information.
[24] A lawyer in an MDP who delivers legal services to the MDP’s clients and who
works with, or is assisted by, a nonlawyer in the MDP who is delivering nonlegal services
in connection with the delivery of legal services to a client should make reasonable efforts
to ensure that the nonlawyer behaves in a manner that discharges the lawyer’s obligation
of confidentiality.
[25] In the context of an MDP, there is a particular concern about the potential loss of the
attorney-client privilege, arising out of the possibility that the MDP’s clients might not be
properly informed as to the separate functions performed by the MDP and that the
members of the MDP would not treat legal matters in a fashion appropriate to the
preservation of the privilege. A lawyer in an MDP should take special care to avoid
endangering the privilege by either the lawyer’s own conduct or that of the MDP itself, or
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(imputed disqualification), and minor changes to Model Rules 5.1233
(responsibilities of a partner or supervisory lawyer), 5.2234 (responsibilities of
a subordinate lawyer) and 5.3235 (responsibilities regarding nonlawyer
its nonlawyer members, and should take such measures as shall be necessary to prevent
disclosure of confidential information to members of the MDP who are not providing
services in connection with the delivery of the legal services to the client.
Id.
232. See App. A, supra note 3. The MDP Commission’s proposed Rule 1.10, “Imputed
Disqualification: General Rule,” provides: “[w]ith respect to an MDP, imputed disqualification
of a lawyer applies if the conflict in regard to the legal services the lawyer is providing is with
any client of the MDP, not just a client of a legal services division of the MDP or of an individual
lawyer member of the MDP.” Id.
233. See id. Under the MDP Comm’n’s report, Model Rule 5.1, “Responsibilities of a
Partner or Supervisory Lawyer,” would be modified to include the following specific references
to MDPs:
(a) A partner or person in a similar position in a law firm or in an MDP shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm or MDP has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm or MDP conform to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct if:
(1) the lawyer orders, or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct
involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm or the MDP in which the other lawyer
practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the
conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated.
Id.
234. See App. A, supra note 3. Under the report, the substance of Model Rule 5.2,
“Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer,” remains the same. Id. It provides:
(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the
lawyer acted at the direction of another person.
(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer
acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable
question of professional duty.
Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.2 (1983). The MDP Comm’n’s
modification comes in the form of a comment which provides: “[t]he exception contained in
paragraph (b) does not apply to acts by the lawyer in accordance with the instructions of a
nonlawyer supervisor.” App. A, supra note 3.
235. See id. Under the MDP Commission’s report, Model Rule 5.3, “Responsibilities
Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants or Associates,” would be amended to include the following
specific references to MDPs:
(a) a partner or person with a comparable role in a law firm or an MDP shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm or MDP has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional
obligations of the lawyer;
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assistants or associates).236 However, the proposed amendments are only
illustrations and were not intended to be binding with respect to specific
language.237
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE RECOMMENDATION
Commentators both for and against MDPs have found problems with the
Commission’s recommendation.238 The complaints include the following:
failure to provide adequate safeguards that will protect the core values of the
legal profession;239 discrimination between attorney-owned and nonattorneyowned MDPs;240 unclear language and ambiguous interpretations;241 problems
with the Commission’s definition of the “practice of law”;242 and the potential
problems created for the states.243 Although this list is hardly exhaustive of
the complaints put forth by commentators, it does indicate many of the main
complaints and demonstrates the fact that many issues will need to be
addressed if the rules are amended to allow MDPs.
A.

Recommendation Fails to Protect the Core Values of the Legal Profession

Almost all commentators have commended the Commission for attempting
to preserve core values of the legal profession.244 At the same time, however,
one of the largest criticisms of the report and recommendation is that the
Commission did not specify how attorneys would be able to stay within the
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations
of the lawyer; and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such person that would be a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the
conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm or in the MDP in which the person is
employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the
conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take
remedial action.
Id.
236. See Regulation of Bar: ABA Multidisciplinary Practice Commission Recommends
Amending Rules to Allow MDPs, supra note 225; App. A, supra note 3.
237. See App. C, supra note 3.
238. See FAQs About Multidisciplinary Practices, supra note 3 (noting that “there has been
little, if any, commentary fully endorsing the recommendation.”).
239. See infra notes 244-57 and accompanying text.
240. See infra notes 258-66 and accompanying text.
241. See infra notes 267-80 and accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 281-93 and accompanying text.
243. See infra notes 294-308 and accompanying text.
244. See FAQs About Multidisciplinary Practices, supra note 3.
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ethical rules.245 Since these types of concerns were not addressed, the
recommendation fails to protect the core values of the legal profession and
thereby fails to provide adequate safeguards to protect clients.246
The recommendation and report have been criticized because the
Commission erroneously assumes nonlawyers will respect and enforce the
legal profession’s ethical rules.247 The recommendation does not thoroughly
address the potential problems that will arise when nonlawyers, whose values
and guiding principles are different from the values and principles of the legal
profession, control MDPs.248 As one commentator notes “[i]f someone else
controls the money, someone else controls you.”249 For these reasons, among
others, the Commission fails to provide procedures that will protect an
attorney’s independent judgment and undivided loyalty to clients.250
Moreover, the recommendation lacks the language necessary to protect
confidentiality and to require lawyers to bind their nonattorney colleagues in
the same way that law firms do now with nonattorney staff.251 Thus, even if
the attorney is not subordinate to the nonattorney, the Commission’s proposal
does not address how lawyers and nonlawyers can “work with” each other
without jeopardizing the core values of the legal profession.252
Theoretically, additional safeguards could be implemented in an attempt to
protect the core values of the legal profession. One commentator argues that
although the Commission cannot impose legal ethics rules on nonattorneys, the

245. See Updated Background Report, supra note 37. See also, e.g., Ritchenya A. Shepherd,
Lawyers Accountants & Beyond: ABA Fee-Splitting Idea Would Spark Multidisciplinary Firms,
NAT’L L.J., June 21, 1999, at A1; The State Bar of California Report with Recommendation to
The House of Delegates (visited Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/sbcalif.html>
[hereinafter State Bar of Cal. Response to MDP Report].
246. See State Bar of Cal. Response to MDP Report, supra note 245.
247. See Vocal Debate on MDP Report, supra note 74 (comment by Lawrence J. Fox of
Drinker Biddle & Reath).
248. See id.; see also Updated Background Report, supra note 37 (inviting comments as to
how the MDP Comm’n should address this concern).
249. Blumenthal & White, supra note 137, at 2 (quoting Lawrence J. Fox). See also Vocal
Debate on MDP Report, supra note 74. Bernard Wolfman of Harvard Law School “suggested
that it is ‘naïve’ to think that law firms dominated by large accounting companies won’t ‘just do
what the owners want them to do.’” Id. Sydney M. Cone III, counsel to Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen
& Hamilton in New York City, claimed that “ [e]ven if lawyers do not receive specific
instructions to subordinate the interests of a particular client to economic concerns of the
nonlawyers who run the MDP . . . lawyers within an MDP will be clearly alert to management’s
expectations and their own career opportunities.” Id.
250. See Blumenthal & White, supra note 137, at 3.
251. See Langford & Zitrin, supra note 90; see also Testimony of Terry, supra note 145
(noting that “[t]he Commission must face the issue of the degree to which it expects MDP
nonlawyers to comply with legal ethics rules.”).
252. State Bar of Cal. Response to MDP Report, supra note 245.
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Commission could take steps to ensure that attorneys and MDPs are able to
For example, the
stay within the legal profession’s ethics rules.253
Commission could provide that attorneys will only be able to work in an MDP
if the nonattorneys in the MDP comply with the professional rules of
conduct.254 Alternatively, the Commission could suggest, “nonlawyers in an
MDP be required to register with the bar, . . .” the corollary of which could be
use of the legal profession’s ethics rules.255 Additionally, certain management
procedures could be implemented to insure the core values of the legal
profession will not be compromised.256 On the other hand, some will question
whether the core values can ever be completely protected in an MDP
controlled by nonattorneys.257
B.

Discrimination Between Attorney and Nonattorney-Controlled MDPs

Another criticism of the recommendation concerns the additional
regulations imposed solely on nonattorney-controlled MDPs.258 In addition to
fulfilling the universal requirements, the nonattorney-controlled MDP must

253. See generally Testimony of Terry, supra note 145; Turman, supra note 13.
254. See Testimony of Terry, surpa note 145 (noting that this approach was adopted by the
German mandatory bar association BundesrechtsanwaltsKammern).
255. See id. (noting that this is the approach suggested by the Consultation Paper of the Law
Society of England Wales).
256. See Turman, supra note 13. Management procedures that could protect the attorney’s
independent judgment include the following:
1. segregating all lawyers in an MDP into separate corporate or administrative units
headed or supervised by lawyers;
2. requiring that evaluation, compensation and promotion of lawyers be principally
undertaken and decided by lawyers; and
3. establishing special ombudsman process to provide a confidential means of
management access for any lawyer who believes that the independence of his or her
professional judgment has been, or threatens to be, compromised.
Id. Moreover:
Adequate management procedures should be in place to assure that confidential client
information is communicated only to such persons (lawyers and non-lawyers) within the
MDP who have a need to know such information in connection with the delivery of legal
services to the client . . . .
Further, management procedures should include a
comprehensive and well-understood policy on client confidentiality within the MDP
organization, the maintenance of segregated filing and record-keeping systems for clients
receiving legal services, and the maintenance of segregated accounting and billing
systems for clients receiving legal services.
Id.
257. See generally discussion supra Part III.B.3.
258. See Weber, supra note 114; FAQs About Multidisciplinary Practices, supra note 3.
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submit to an annual certification and audit requirement.259 Criticisms to this
proposal are that such distinctions are discriminatory and create obstacles for
the nonattorney-controlled law firm that cannot be overcome.260
Moreover, even if the obstacles can be overcome, the claim is that
nonattorneys would have little incentive to form MDPs since they would incur
cost and inconvenience that attorney-owned MDPs would not incur.261 The
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”), for one,
already announced their opposition to the proposal, claiming they would not
subject themselves to attorneys’ standards.262 According to the AICPA, the
Commission’s “regulatory approach” is impractical and will inhibit rather than
further client choice.263 In addition, the AICPA asserts that there is no
evidence that indicates such burdensome regulations are necessary and argues
that even if they are necessary, there are no reasons why attorney-controlled
MDPs should not have to submit to them.264
To address these complaints, the Commission seems to be considering
subjecting all MDPs to the audit and certification procedures, and/or extending
the audit and certification requirements to a firm (as defined in the Model
Rules) and each lawyer in a firm.265 While this may be the only way to avoid
discrimination complaints in this area, the burdens already imposed on the
state courts under the recommendation will probably multiply if both attorney
and nonattorney-owned MDPs must submit to the regulatory requirements.266
C. Recommendation Provides Inadequate Explanations
Some have criticized the proposal for vague language and incomplete
specifications, both of which lead to a variety of often creative and competing

259. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. But see Updated Background Report, supra
note 37 (“The Recommendation endeavored to assure that clients would be informed of the
differences in the services and protections offered, thereby reducing client confusion.”).
260. See Weber, supra note 114. But see Report, supra note 3:
The Commission believes that the recommended procedures required of such MDPs do
not constitute an unreasonable burden . . . . Since the MDP and its members must
conduct themselves so as not to permit violations of the rules of professional conduct,
these procedures will make senior officials of the MDP sensitive to these special
obligations.
Id.
261. See Weber, supra note 114.
262. See Bacon, supra note 96, at 8.
263. Resolution of the AICPA Regarding ABA’s MDP Recommendation, reprinted in
Multidisciplinary Practice: Is it the Wave of the Future or Only a Ripple, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 460,
463-64 (1999).
264. See id.
265. See Updated Background Report, supra note 37.
266. See discussion infra Part V.E.
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interpretations.267
For instance, although the report prohibits passive
investment in general, it is not necessarily prohibited in the context of an
MDP.268 Moreover, under the recommendation, a professional service firm
can intentionally form alliances with law firms or lawyers who represent
clients adverse to the professional service firm’s clients and thereby disqualify
the law firm or lawyers from representing the adverse clients.269 In other
words, a professional service firm could intentionally create conflicts to
protect its clients.270 Such attempts will threaten attorneys’ independent
judgment and will potentially inhibit access to legal representation.271
Additionally, the Commission does not adequately define certain
ambiguous terms.272 For instance, the term “disciplines” is not adequately
explained so that there are no limits on the types of service providers that can
join law firms to form an MDP.273 Accordingly, professionals that are unable
or unwilling to respect legal ethics rules are able to join MDPs.274 The Board
of Governors for the State of California claims that the Commission never
provides an adequate definition for the “reasonable efforts” attorneys are

267. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 50. See also, e.g., State Bar of Cal. Response to MDP
Report, supra note 245 (“The principles recommended by the ABA lack the clarity and
specificity necessary to ascertain the types of legal practice that will result from these
principles.”).
268. See Levinson, supra note 50. According to Levinson:
Professional Service Firm (PSF), with no attorneys, enters into a profit-sharing alliance
with Law Firm (LF), qualifying as a non-lawyer-controlled MDP. The firms make no
attempt to offer legal and nonlegal services to the same clients. PSF invests capital into
LF, and periodically collects its share of the profits. Result – PSF is virtually a passive
investor.
Id.
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See generally supra note 267.
273. Levinson, supra note 50. See also Harold Levinson, The Risks of Multidisciplinary
Practice, N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1999, at 2 (noting that “[t]he ABA report gives an open-ended list of
who, in addition to lawyers, may own interests in an MDP. The list includes accountants,
economic forecasters, financial planners, lobbyists, psychological counselors, social workers,
architects and tax preparers.”); Molly McDonough, ISBA at Odds with Proposal for Combined
Practices, CHI. DAILY BULL., June 28, 1999, at 1 (reporting that an ABA Delegate of Santa
Monica, California remarked, “[l]iterally, a lawyer and a prostitute can go into business . . . .
There is no end to the number of people lawyers can form partnerships with and hard-sell their
products and services.”).
274. See Levinson, supra note 50 (noting that “[t]he Commission’s examples could encourage
even more troublesome interpretations of the ‘disciplines’ that qualify for inclusion in MDPs,
extending to a wide variety of relatively uneducated, unlicensed, unregulated and uncontrollable
occupations. Members of these occupations might be unwilling or unable to respect the ‘unique
role of the legal profession.’”).
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required to demonstrate in an MDP.275 It also notes further ambiguity
regarding the term “all clients” of an MDP.276
Additionally, although the Commission makes the distinction between
attorney-controlled and nonattorney-controlled MDPs, the Commission does
not define “control.”277 Obviously, the omission of a clear definition could
lead to difficulties in enforcing the additional regulations upon nonattorney
controlled MDPs.278 For example, if the nonattorneys are only employees of
the MDP and the control test is essentially based on the number of partners,
the control test is not met.279 However, the nonattorneys could “virtually
control” the MDP if they either outnumber the partners in the law firm or bring
a substantial amount of new clients to the law firm.280 Ultimately, the vague
language and ambiguous definitions employed by the Commission will
potentially lead to various interpretations, some of which impair the core
values of the legal profession.
D. Problems with the Commission’s Definition of “Practice of Law”
Another problem with the Commission’s recommendation is that it
expands the definition of the term “practice of law” so that it encompasses
anything a lawyer does.281 This creates a problem because many of the

275. State Bar of Cal. Response to MDP Report, supra note 245. See also Langford & Zitrin,
supra note 90 (noting that “[r]easonable efforts aren’t good enough; attorneys can and should be
required to get this job done, period, or suffer the consequences.”).
276. Id. The Board of Governors claims the following questions regarding the term “all
clients” are left unresolved by the MDP Comm’n’s recommendation:
Are those “clients” only those persons who engage the MDP for legal services? If so,
does a customer who initially receives only non-legal services become a “client” for legal
services upon learning that a lawyer within the MDP is assisting the nonlawyers? Is there
automatic transformance? Is there “delivery of legal services” if the lawyer’s work is
internal only? If a lawyer is assisting nonlawyers or works only behind the scenes, is the
customer a “client?”
Id.
277. Levinson, supra note 50.
278. See id.; Sydney M. Cone, Multidisciplinary Practice (“MDP”): Comments on ABA
Commission Report Released June 8, 1999 (the “Report”) (visited Jan. 6, 2000)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/cone3.html>.
279. See Levinson, supra note 50.
280. Id. See also Cone, supra note 278. “For this purpose, a state that decides to permit
lawyers to practice in MDPs might adopt a black-letter definition of ‘control’ or might leave the
concept of ‘control’ to common law definition by the courts.” Id.
281. Michael Paul, Manager’s Journal: Law Firms Shouldn’t Be for Lawyers Only, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 9, 1999, at A18; FAQs About Multidisciplinary Practices, supra note 3. See also
supra note 221; Vocal Debate on MDP Report, supra note 74 (noting that the definition provided
by the MDP Comm’n goes beyond any definition anyone advocated in their testimony). But see
id. (reporting that Sherwin Simmons, the Chair of the MDP Comm’n, claims the MDP Comm’n
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lawyer’s activities do not directly fall under the definition of “practice of
law.”282 For instance, even though activities such as lobbying, media
relations, estate planning and marriage counseling are not necessarily related
to the “practice of law,” such services would probably be included in the
Commission’s definition since they are also provided by attorneys.283
Obviously the tax and “consulting” services that the Big Five currently
offer would fall under the Commission’s definition.284 Thus, under this
definition a “non-law firm” that employs attorneys, can become a de facto law
firm, and thus be subject to the legal profession’s ethics rules.285 Likewise,
nonattorneys may avoid MDPs because they do not want to be accused of
practicing law and thereby be forced to adhere to the legal profession’s ethics
rules.286 Some fear that disciplinary proceedings will be brought against a
nonattorney whose activities traverse legal services and services offered by
other professionals.287 Others fear that non-law firms might stop offering the
services they do today because they do not want to be charged with the
unauthorized practice of law.288
Yet the Commission has since made it clear that its intent in defining the
“practice of law” as it did was to “leave the definition to the individual
jurisdictions.”289 The Commission never intended its definition to be

came across more than 3000 definitions of the “practice of law” and, thus, had difficulty in
attempting to define it accurately).
282. Paul, supra note 281. But see Vocal Debate on MDP Report, supra note 74. Robert H.
Mundheim, a member of the MDP Comm’n, remarked that although the MDP Comm’n’s
definition of “the practice of law” would include many borderline activities, this might simply
“be one of the trade-offs to working in an MDP.” Id.
283. Paul, supra note 281.
284. See Weber, supra note 114 (noting that under the MDP Comm’n’s definition of the term
“practice of law,” “the tax preparation firm and the information technology consultancy become
de facto law firms, subject to bar rules.”).
285. Weber, supra note 114.
286. See id.
287. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 135. Such proceedings:
[W]ould be a giant leap backward for the legal profession. The delivery of legal and lawrelated services through nonlawyer controlled entities has long been accepted in this
country. The first legalized MDPs in this country were accounting firms offering tax law
services under the auspices of federal statutes and regulations, which pre-empt state
attempts to interfere with such activities . . . . The American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants has adopted a resolution, objecting to the commission’s proposal on these
grounds.
Id.
288. See Weber, supra note 114. The result would be fewer choices then are available today.
Id.
289. Updated Background Report, supra note 37.
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exclusive;290 rather, it was intended as an example of one possible
definition.291 At the same time, if states are as apt to follow the ABA as many
believe,292 providing even an illustrative definition of the “practice of law”
will create a number of problems for the legal profession.293
E.

Problems for the State Courts

The recommendation has also been criticized for the problems it poses to
the state courts.294 First, the proposal may place huge burdens on the state
courts to regulate “multijurisdictional” MDPs.295 While the report mentions
multijurisdictional MDPs, it does not explain how the proposal will apply to
them.296 Furthermore, the Commission gives little guidance regarding how
states should audit and monitor MDPs.297 The Commission does not clarify
the “logistics of a court audit.”298 For example, the Commission does not
specify who will conduct the audit, it does not promulgate rules of procedure
to be followed in conducting the audit and it does not express standards an
entity should use in making a judgment.299
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See generally infra note 368 and accompanying text. See also Vocal Debate on MDP
Report, supra note 74. According to Sherwin Simmons, the definition was provided by the MDP
Comm’n, in part, because the states may be unwilling “to tackle the definition” on their own. Id.
293. Due to the criticism received regarding its attempt to define the “practice of law”, the
MDP Comm’n is questioning whether it should include a definition at all in subsequent
recommendations and has invited comments on this issue. See Updated Background Report,
supra note 37.
294. See e.g., Cone, supra note 278; Levinson, supra note 50; Statement of DRI, supra note
191.
295. Levinson, supra note 50.
296. See id; see also Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 135:
Suppose, for example, an MDP with lawyers licensed and working in Washington, D.C.,
and Austin wished to provide advice about intellectual property matters to a company
headquartered in Alabama. The proposal would require the MDP to register with the
Alabama Supreme Court, and be subject to audit by that court. But what happens if the
Alabama Court demands that the MDP adopt procedures inconsistent with those imposed
on it by the Texas Supreme Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals? If adopted, the
commission’s recommendations would establish barriers to entry and substantially inhibit
the formation of nonlawyer-controlled MDPs in the United States.
Id.
297. See Vocal Debate on MDP Report, supra note 74. Laurel Terry, a Professor at
Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law, contended that “[t]he commission has
acquired tremendous expertise in this area . . . and at a minimum it should help out the state
courts by drafting, for example, a list of items that a state court should request in the context of an
MDP audit.” Id.
298. FAQs About Multidisciplinary Practices, supra note 3.
299. See id.
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Additionally, insofar as the Commission’s recommendation proposes that
state courts monitor and audit MDPs to ensure compliance with the Model
Rules, the courts’ resources will be heavily overburdened.300 State Supreme
Courts already have enough to do without having to license and monitor
MDPs and attorneys who practice in them.301 Moreover, at least one
commentator claims, “it is at best wishful thinking and at worst naïve to
suggest that underfunded court systems can regulate powerful economic
interests.”302
Furthermore, state constitutional problems may arise.303 Traditionally, the
state legislatures and administrative agencies have exercised control over
many businesses and professions and any attempt for courts to exercise
dominion over these entities might violate separation of powers under state
constitutions.304
The Commission is considering “whether and to what extent it can
contribute any guidance to the states to assist them in structuring the
regulatory and certification procedures.”305 In addition, the Commission
seems to be considering peer review as an alternative to the audit and
certification process.306 At the same time, however, the Commission clearly
felt its recommendation was “feasible,” and thus, may be reluctant to alter its
position on this issue. 307 Moreover, the Commission clearly believes that the
details of the process need “to be worked out within each jurisdiction in

300. See Anna Snider, City Bar Endorses New Types of Practices, N.Y.L.J., July 21, 1999, at
1.
301. See Phillip S. Anderson, If a Multidisciplinary Practice Offers Legal Services, Its
Lawyers Must Be Regulated, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 9, 1999, at B7. But see id.:
If state supreme courts do not protect the public, however, who will. MDP lawyers
receive licenses to practice from their states’ highest courts. The rules of professional
conduct should make clear that these lawyers are subject to regulation to the same degree
as those in traditional practice and that entities that employ them, traditional or otherwise,
must be regulated as well . . . . The alternatives are to permit MDP lawyers to remain
unregulated, to attempt to evaluate them without their employers’ consent or to prohibit
lawyers from providing services in MDPs.
Id.
302. Statement of DRI, supra note 191.
303. See Levinson, supra note 50.
304. See id; see also Cone, supra note 278. (“[T]he Report would turn the court into an
administrative agency having the open-ended assignment of policing MDP compliance with legal
rules of ethics.”); Vocal Debate on MDP Report, supra note 74 (Bernard Wolfman notes that
although someone will have to regulate and monitor MDPs, people cannot expect state Supreme
Courts to undertake that task because it will “sidetrack them from their principal role.”).
305. Updated Background Report, supra note 37.
306. See id. (requesting comments regarding peer review as an alternative to the audit and
certification process).
307. Id.
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response to local needs, practices, and concerns.”308 Insofar as the details are
left to the states, many of the aforementioned criticisms are still relevant.
F.

A Few Other Criticisms

The recommendation has been criticized for various other reasons.
Although there are too many to identify here, a few other criticisms can be
mentioned. For instance, although the Commission recommended the
elimination of fee-splitting, it fails to explain why the elimination is necessary
or desirable in order to have MDPs.309 As the Commission itself points out,
“[p]rovided that the contractual arrangement is not a sham masking fee sharing
or papering over what is really a partnership relationship with respect to the
control and management of the law firm, it does not appear that the Contract or
Affiliation Model violates the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.”310 Thus,
even though the Commission relies on the European models to support its
recommendation, it ultimately goes beyond what these models permit.311
Another major problem arises from the so-called “imputation rule.”312
Under the imputation rule, conflict of interest rules are applied to law firms.313
Thus, “a relatively minor conflict of interest involving an associate in the
United States could foil the rainmaking efforts of a partner in Hong Kong . . . .
[,]” if she were unable to comply with the shielding provisions necessary to
avoid conflicts of interest. 314 The Commission, however, has been criticized
for failing to adequately address this issue.315
Also, “the proposal opens the door to lawyers providing services to the
public through any kind of for-profit organization that chooses to provide legal
services to the public, provided only that it hold itself out as providing some
nonlegal service.”316 Thus, any number of companies or businesses could hire
attorneys and thereby provide legal services.317

308. Id.
309. See State Bar of Cal. Response to MDP Report, supra note 245. The Board of
Governors refers to App. C for the proposition that in other countries, with the exception of
Switzerland, “one stop shopping is permitted while having lawyers remain in control of, and
billing for, the legal service separately from nonlegal services.” Id.
310. Updated Background Report, supra note 37.
311. See State Bar of Cal. Response to MDP Report, supra note 245.
312. FAQs About Multidisciplinary Practices, supra note 3.
313. See id.
314. Id.
315. See id.
316. State Bar of Cal. Response to MDP Report, supra note 245.
317. See id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

678

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:629

VI. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR THE FUTURE
There are alternatives to the Commission’s recommendation. Obviously,
the Model Rules could be left alone.318 In the alternative, a number of
different amendments could be made to the Model Rules to regulate MDPs
and, at the same time, attempt to protect the core values of the legal
profession.319 In addition, there are different structures through which MDPs
could be permitted to operate.320 The Commission appeared to be exploring
some of the different options before making its recommendation.321 Although
the Commission failed to examine the implementation of alternatives in
detail,322 it may be willing to consider some of the alternatives more critically
in its upcoming report and recommendation.323
A.

Leave the Rules Alone

One alternative to the entire MDP movement is to leave the rules alone.324
Leaving the rules alone is certainly a viable, and perhaps necessary,
alternative. Within the course of leaving the rules alone, the legal profession
has two options.325
First and most simply, the legal profession could do nothing.326 Instead of
taking any type of immediate action, the legal profession could simply wait
and watch the actions of clients and the unregulated actions of professional
service firms to see what happens.327
In the alternative, the legal profession could take immediate action and, at
the same time, leave the rules alone by strictly enforcing UPL statutes and
other ethics rules.328 Additionally, the legal profession could focus on ways to
improve the profession and the services it provides to the public.329 For
example, if the concern is that the legal profession needs to be able to compete
in a global market, the profession could upgrade its quality of service, adopt
318. See infra notes 324-37 and accompanying text.
319. See infra notes 338-49 and accompanying text.
320. See infra notes 350-63 and accompanying text; supra notes 16-46 and accompanying
text.
321. See Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
322. See generally Recommendation, supra note 3; General Information Form, supra note 7;
Report, supra note 3; App. A, supra note 3; App. C, supra note 3; Hypotheticals and Models,
supra note 16.
323. See Updated Background Report, supra note 37.
324. Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
325. See generally Toby Brown, Accounting 101 for Lawyers or Too Late, You Lose?, 12
UTAH B. J. 8, 11 (1999).
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See Updated Background Report, supra note 37; Brown, supra note 325, at 11.
329. See generally Levinson, supra note 50.
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attractive methods of professional service firms and explain the benefit of
independent law firms to the public.330 Moreover, if the concern is providing
clients with more effective and efficient services, the Commission could also
consider “ancillary business law firms; networks including law firms and other
professional firms; referrals to members of non-law professions; and expanded
roles of in-house professionals in non-law professions.”331 Thus, instead of
changing the rules, the Commission could have proposed clarifying and
enforcing the existing rules in a way that would accommodate some of the
recognized needs of our current economy.332
Although the Commission mentions and finds support for leaving the rules
alone as an alternative,333 it ultimately seems to presume MDPs are inevitable
and proceeds accordingly.334 According to the Commission, professional
service firms, such as the Big Five, are already delivering legal services and
the states are doing nothing to enforce existing rules.335 In its future report or
recommendation, however, the Commission might be willing to consider
whether increased enforcement of UPL statutes and related professional
conduct rules is in the best interest of the public or an achievable objective.336
Moreover, assuming increased enforcement is not an achievable objective, the
Commission seems willing to consider simply maintaining the status quo.337
330. See Levinson, supra note 50.
331. Id. But see App. C, supra note 3:
In consumer groups’ collective opinion, a dual practice model cannot meet these
[integrated professional advice] needs. There are not enough lawyers with the requisite
skill in the other disciplines. Given the demand of modern law practice and ever growing
complexity of all subject matter areas, it is difficult for lawyers to keep abreast of the
developments in more than one discipline.
Id.
332. See generally Levinson, supra note 50.
333. See Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16; Updated Background Report, supra note
37 (noting that many critics of the MDP Comm’n’s recommendation “call for stepped up
enforcement of (1) the ethics rules prohibiting a lawyer from assisting a nonlawyer in the practice
of law and (2) unauthorized practice of law (UPL) statutes prohibiting the delivery of legal
services by corporations and other business entities controlled by nonlawyers.”).
334. See Levinson, supra note 50.
335. See Updated Background Report, supra note 37:
For example, in 1998 the UPL Committee of the Texas Supreme Court announced that it
would not file a complaint against Arthur Anderson after an eleven month investigation.
In 1999, Virginia bar counsel made a similar statement with respect to the compliance law
services offered by an unnamed professional services firm.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
336. See id. (inviting comments in this area).
337. See id. The MDP Comm’n has also has requested comments on whether “assuming
arguendo that such enforcement is unlikely, whether the public interest would be served by
continuing the status quo in which the lawyers working for the Big Five and other professional
and consulting firms are essentially unregulated by the bar.” Id.
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Alternative Amendments or Safeguards

Initially, the Commission mentioned two alternative amendments that
could be made to the Model Rules.338 First, while Model Rule 5.4 could
simply be amended to permit nonlawyer principals in a law firm, legal conflict
of interest rules, including imputation, could be extended to everyone.339
Second, the Commission mentioned simply amending Model Rules 5.4 and
1.10(a).340 The Commission stated that “[a]n amended Rule 1.10(a) could
provide either (1) that there is no imputation, only disqualification by personal
participation, or (2) that imputation exists among the professionals in any
service firm holding itself out as providing legal services.”341 The amendment
to Rule 1.10(a) would require departmentalization within the MDP, since the
lawyer’s rules would apply to “law” departments, but not to “non-lawyer”
departments.342 In its upcoming report and recommendation the Commission
could certainly consider various other limited amendments to the Model Rules.
In the alternative, the Commission could analyze and make amendments for
each Model Rule that has traditionally prevented the development of fully
integrated MDPs.343
Additionally, the Commission could analyze and discuss additional
safeguards to be implemented through a new Model Rule.344 For instance, in
addition to requiring some sort of departmentalization, the Commission could
require oversight by a supervisory attorney who would have ultimate authority
with respect to the lawyers in a particular department.345 Moreover, it could
recommend that only those attorneys practicing in such separate departments
338. See Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
339. See id.
340. See id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See Testimony of Terry, supra note 145:
For example, the Commission should consider additions that could be made to the
definition of a firm, and to MRPC 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 5.3 and 5.4. In addition, the
Commission should consider how it would interpret the “publicity or marketing”
provisions found in MRPC 7.1-7.5; money related issues found in MRPC 1.15, as well as
state random audit statutes and client security fund provisions; fee issues arising under
MRPC 1.5; pro bono requirements under MRPC 6.1; competence requirements under
MRPC 1.1 (and the relationship of this requirement to lawyers participating in selling
standardized “products”); training and supervision requirements such as those found in
MRPC 5.1-5.3; and disclosure obligations, such as those found in MRPC 3.3 and 4.1.
Id.
344. See generally Updated Background Report, supra note 37.
345. See id. The supervisory attorney’s duties would include “for example, deciding the
number of lawyers and support personnel necessary to staff a matter and which lawyers to assign
to a matter, and fixing the terms and conditions of the compensation of the lawyers in the unit.”
Id.
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be able to present themselves as practicing law.346 In other words, if an
attorney were assigned to a “non-legal” unit of the MDP, the attorney would
not be able to provide legal services to clients.347 Furthermore, the
Commission could recommend “specific practices and procedures to preserve
the attorney-client and work product privileges . . . .”348 Ultimately, it seems
that a number of different practices and procedures could be implemented in
an attempt to protect the core values of the legal profession.349 Whether any of
them will actually ameliorate threats to the core values is another question.
C. Different Models
While the Commission mentioned and illustrated several alternative
models, it did not consider implementing them in any detail in its report or
recommendation.350 Rather, it simply urged that the Model Rules be amended
to permit fully integrated MDPs.351 The Commission may, however, be
willing to consider alternative models more critically in the future.352
One alternative is the “Command and Control Model” (the “D.C. Model”)
with or without modification.353 While the Commission could simply
recommend replacing Model Rule 5.4 with D.C.’s version of the rule, other
options are available.354 For instance, instead of requiring the practice of law
to be the “sole purpose” of the MDP, the Commission could require the
practice of law to be a “ principle purpose” of the MDP.355 Moreover, it could
limit the vocation of a “nonlawyer partner” to a “nonlawyer professional.”356
346. See id.
347. Id. “Furthermore, it would be the responsibility of the MDP and each such person to
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the MDP’s clients understand that the person is not acting
as a lawyer even though that person is licensed to practice law.” Id.
348. Id. (requesting comments regarding what those practices and procedures should be).
349. See, e.g., supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
350. See generally Report, supra note 3; Recommendation, supra note 3; App. A, supra note
3; App. C, supra note 3; Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16.
351. See Updated Background Report, supra note 37.
352. See generally id. (The MDP Comm’n has requested Comments regarding adopting the
D.C. Model with or without modification as an alternative to “the Fully Integrated Model.”).
353. Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 16; Updated Background Report, supra note 37.
354. See Updated Background Report, supra note 37.
355. Id. (requesting comments on this modification).
356. Id. (requesting comments on this modification). The MDP Comm’n has requested
comments on:
[A]ssuming arguendo that partnership with only a nonlawyer professional is in the public
interest,
a) how “nonlawyer professional” should be defined;
b) whether the public’s interest would be adequately protected by defining a
nonlawyer professional as “a member of a recognized profession whose conduct is
governed by ethical standards;”
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Another option is the “Contract Model.”357 According to the Commission,
theoretically this model may be permissible under the Model Rule’s current
framework.358 However, if this model is recognized as permissible, problems
may arise.359 While the law firm is a separate legal entity, the Commission
recognizes that at “some point even if there is no formal fee sharing, economic
interdependence may so entwine legal firms with nonlegal firms that they
become a single entity.”360 The law firm may become so financially dependent
on the non-law firm that attorneys’ independent professional judgment will be
threatened.361 The Commission could, however, implement standards of
evaluation to determine whether the law firm and professional services firm
have become so interdependent that they have become a single entity.362
Additionally, the Commission could recommend that the highest state court
with jurisdiction review each contract between the law firm and the non-law
firm, even though such a proposal would be burdensome and unwieldy at
best.363

c) whether the definition in item b) should be supplemented in the text or
accompanying commentary by an illustrative recitation of nonlawyer professionals
similar to that found in the comments to the Model Rule 5.7 and the Washington D.C.
version of Rule 5.4 or should be left to the states.
d) what measurements should be used to determine that the lawyer-principals of the
MDP actually possess the power to resolve issues relating to the firm’s finances,
management, operations, and ethical responsibilities. Is it sufficient simply to require
that fifty-one percent of the firm’s principals be lawyers? Should supra-majority
requirements for all or certain types of decisions be required in MDPs?
e) what specific practices and policies capable of expression in a rule of professional
conduct exist to create and foster an institutional culture conducive to the observance
of ethical norms?
Id.
357. Id.
358. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
359. See Updated Background Report, supra note 37.
360. Updated Background Report, supra note 37. “Evidence of such interdependence might
include, for example, brand naming, concessions or other economic benefits to offshore affiliates,
and benefits to each other’s clients.” Id.
361. See id. At the same time, “a similar danger can arise in any instance in which a law firm
is dependent on a single client for a substantial portion of its revenue. Fear of antagonizing the
client may interfere with the exercise of independent professional judgment by the firm’s
lawyers.” Id.
362. See id. (requesting comments on this procedure).
363. See id. (requesting comments on this procedure); see also discussion supra Part V.E.
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VII. FUTURE IMPACT OF THE RECOMMENDATION
A.

What Does the Recommendation Mean?

For now, the Commission’s recommendation is just that, a
recommendation, and it will not be the official position of the ABA until
passed by the House of Delegates.364 Moreover, even if the House agrees to
adopt the Commission’s recommendation, it will take two to three years to
draft and approve amendments to the Model Rules.365 Subsequently, the
individual states would have ample opportunity to decide whether they want to
allow MDPs.366
Since the states and D.C. are autonomous jurisdictions, the Model Rules
are just a recommended approach. As such, they are not binding on the
various jurisdictions.367 Some believe that because most states’ legal ethics
rules already mirror the Model Rules, there is reason to believe the states will
adopt the Commission’s recommendation if the ABA approves it.368 Yet,
states’ responses to the Commission’s proposal make it clear that the issues are
both complex and troubling, and indicate they will not modify their rules
without careful consideration of all the implications.369
364. See James Wilber, Multidisciplinary Practice: American Bar Association States Out
Position on MDPs, reprinted in 7 NEVADA LAW. 8, 8 (1999); see also Shepherd, supra note 245
(noting that although under normal circumstances all that is needed to approve an action is a
majority of the House of Delegates, since MDPs would involve such a drastic change in the legal
profession, opponents may call for a supermajority vote).
365. See Vocal Debate on MDP Report, supra note 74 (comment by Sherwin Simmons, Chair
of the Commission); see also Regulation of Bar: ABA Multidisciplinary Practice Commission
Recommends Amending the Rules to Allow MDPs, supra note 225. If the recommendation is
approved by the House of Delegates, the matter would have to be referred to the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics of Professional Responsibility and the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission
who would make and propose the necessary amendments. The amendments would then come
back to the House of Delegates for their approval. Id.
366. See Wilber, supra note 364, at 8.
367. See id; see also Andrews, supra note 58, at 596 (“The ABA, because it is only a
professional association, has absolutely no authority over the practice of law anywhere in the
country. That authority, instead, is exercised primarily by the state court systems, and to a lesser
extent, by the state legislatures, and by the three branches of the federal government.”).
368. See id; see also Andrews, supra note 58, at 596 (noting that “ABA ethics codes have
been copied or heavily relied upon by state courts and legislatures, and thus given the force of
law.”).
369. See, e.g., Updated Background Report, supra note 37 (Prior to the vote, the Florida Bar
submitted a motion directing the ABA to postpone voting until “additional study” indicated the
profession’s core values would not be impaired.); Rocco Commarere, Multidisciplinary
Practices: State Bar Turns Guns on Plan, Fears Radical Change for Profession, N.J. LAW., July
26, 1999, at 851 (noting that the New Jersey State Bar Association had many problems with the
MDP Comm’n’s recommendation and would not allow MDPs in accordance with the proposal);
State Bar of Cal. Response to MDP Report, supra note 245 (taking the position that the ABA
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Impact of the Recommendation and MDPs in General

The Commission’s recommendation, if adopted, would have an immense
impact on both the legal profession and the public.370 MDPs will lead to
dramatic changes in the way legal and other services are provided in the
United States.371 At least one commentator claims that, if MDPs are permitted
to operate, the legal profession will undergo more change in the next ten years
than has occurred in the past 3,000 years.372
1. The Potential Impact on Law Firms
a. Small Law Firms
Large law firms and the Big Five are not the only parties potentially
affected by MDPs. Although the nature and extent of the impact are unknown,
small firms and solo practitioners will certainly feel an impact.373 One fear is
that MDPs will put small firms and solo practitioners out of business
altogether.374 Another concern is that small firms may try to do too much for
should defer final action until demand for and meaning of MDPs could be better understood and
until the MDP Comm’n could ensure the core values of the legal profession would not be
affected); Multidisciplinary Practice: Is It the Wave of the Future or Only a Ripple, 66 DEF.
COUNS. J. 460, 461:
The original wording of the Florida resolution had used the words “extensive and wellreasoned analysis” in the place of the substituted words “additional study.” In that form,
the resolution had been supported by state bars in Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, and South Carolina, as well [as] local
bars in Broward County (Florida), Monroe County (New York) and San Diego County
(California).
Id.
370. See State Bar of Cal. Response to MDP Report, supra note 245. See also Background
Paper, supra note 9 (noting that “this development impacts every American lawyer, as well as
our colleagues around the world . . . .”).
371. See Brodsky, supra note 100 (noting the change “could cause an amalgamation of law
firms and accounting firms as has been seen in Europe in recent years.”).
372. See Paskind, supra note 50; see also Edward Fennell, US Moves to One-Stop Shops,
TIMES (London), June 22, 1999, at 39. Stuart Benson, a legal consultant with Howard Nash
Management, compared the use of MDPs with mobile phones stating “[a]t first they will be
considered unnecessary and no one will use them. But within a short time they will be a major
feature.” Id.
373. See Conley, ABA Takes on MDP, supra note 104:
The lawyer running a solo practice out of the same brick storefront on the town square
where his father practiced, the law school classmates who formed a tax boutique and the
25-lawyer powerhouse firm also stand to gain or lose if lawyers are allowed to join forces
with nonlegal professionals.
Id.
374. See Rocco Cammarere, Panals at Odds over MDPs: State Bar ABA Clash, N.J. LAW.,
June 28, 1999, at 1.
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the client to keep the client from going somewhere else.375 Furthermore, since
small firms and solo practitioners do not compete internationally, they may not
have the same desire to see the rules amended to allow MDPs.376
Nevertheless, the Commission heard support from both small firms and
solo practitioners who desired to combine legal work with other professional
services.377 Some commentators even argue that small firms and solo
practitioners will benefit the most from the recommendation.378 If small firms
and solo practitioners were able to form MDPs, clients would no longer have
to turn to large firms to provide the same services.379 Also, a greater risk
might exist for large firms because the nonattorney professions might not fit in
well with the large firm, or the firm might misjudge the public’s demand for
other services.380 Moreover, small firms may benefit more than larger firms
from the development of MDPs because the larger the law firm is, the more
likely a conflict of interest will develop.381 Thus, there seems to be a direct
relation between the size of the firm and the ability to take advantage of the
Commission’s recommendation.382

375. See Conley, ABA Takes on MDP, supra note 104 (comment by Bruce H. Gaynes, a
principal at Kitchens Kelley Gaynes and a certified public accountant).
376. See id. (comment by Morton A. Harris of Hatcher, Stubbs, Land, Hollis & Rothschild).
377. See Brodsky, supra note 100. “The commission heard from lawyers from small firms or
legal services organizations who desired to combine legal services with social work, psychology,
accounting, engineering or other non-legal professional expertise that clients would currently
need to turn to a larger firm and outside experts to find.” Id.
378. See FAQs About Multidisciplinary Practices, supra note 3. (noting “[w]hile many
[small and solo practitioners] are wary, some see an opportunity and feel their practices would
thrive if they could offer packaged services to their clients.”).
379. See Brodsky, supra note 100; see also Donna Dudickand & Nina A. Landsberg, OneStop Shopping for Services Challenges Suburban Lawyers, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 14,
1999, at 1. Louis Teti, an attorney with Macelree, Harvey, Gallagher, Featherman & Sebastian
and President of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, notes “some small firms believe they could
become more competitive if they join hands with other professionals such as psychologists,
accountants and financial advisors.” Id.
380. See Conley, ABA Takes on MDP, supra note 104 (comment by Frank S. McGaughey, a
member of the executive committee at Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy).
381. See id. According to Ralph B. Levy:
[T]here is huge potential for conflicts if a big law firm such as Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue merged with a large accounting firm such as Arthur Andersen. Both have global
client bases and represent some of the world’s major companies and competitors. Small
firms with smaller, less geographically diverse client bases are less likely to have
conflicts . . . .
Id.
382. See id. (comment by Ralph B. Levy). But see id. Bruce Gaynes, a principal at an
Atlanta law firm and a certified public accountant argues that “a small firm might be reluctant to
join forces with a CPA for fear of losing referrals from other accountants in the community.” Id.
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b. Large Law Firms
One of the driving forces behind the MDP movement is the large law
firms’ desire to compete with the Big Five.383 While the Commission’s
recommendation attempts to advance this desire, large law firms may in fact
face increased competition since the Big Five will set up MDPs in the United
States.384 Although independent law firms already face competition from the
Big Five and other professional service firms in areas such as labor,
environmental, tax, regulatory and business practice, if MDPs are permitted to
operate, such firms will also face competition in the area of purely legal
services such as litigation.385 Thus, as much as thirty billion dollars in annual
fee revenues to United States law firms could be jeopardized.386 At the same
time, large firms may not readily make changes that affect the way they
practice.387 Most law firms’ primary interest is to practice law.388
c. Medium Sized Law Firms
Some believe MDPs will have the most detrimental effect on mediumsized firms.389 Many medium-sized firms already feel pressure from larger
firms.390 Thus, if multinational MDPs are also allowed to compete, the
pressure already felt by medium-sized firms is likely to increase
dramatically.391
2. The Potential Impact on the Public
Although MDPs will certainly have an effect on the public, the precise
impact they will have has not been widely recognized.392 At least one
commentator believes there will be a huge demand for the services provided

383. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
384. See FAQs About Multidisciplinary Practices, supra note 3.
385. See Ward Bower, Strategic Planning; ABA Report Endorses MDPs: What Should Your
Firm Do?, LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP & BENEFITS, July 1999, at 3 [hereinafter Bower, Strategic
Planning].
386. See id.
387. See Shepherd, supra note 245.
388. See id. James P. Holden, a tax lawyer with Washington D.C.’s Steptoe & Johnson,
states “I suspect that law firms are going to be slow to go into other businesses. Lawyers are
predominantly interested in practicing law.” Id.
389. See FAQs About Multidisciplinary Practices, supra note 3; Ward Bower,
Multidisciplinary Practices: The Impact of MDPS on Law Firms, 18 NO. 5 LEGAL MGMT.,
Sept./Oct., 1999, at 46.
390. See FAQs About Multidisciplinary Practices, supra note 3.
391. See id.
392. See Bower, Strategic Planning, supra note 385.
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by an MDP if for no other reason than convenience.393 Clients will certainly
be taking risks in areas of confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and
independence of professional judgment if they choose to engage the services
of an MDP.394 Although the full impact of these risks appears somewhat
unclear, the commentator suggests that clients will be willing to forego these
risks for the sake of convenience.395
C. Impact of MDPs despite the recommendation
Some believe MDPs are inevitable despite the ABA’s position on the
matter.396 Others believe that if the rules are not amended to allow MDPs,
Europe will become this century’s “hub of legal services” as multinational and
United States corporations seek firms that can address all of the issues their
problems entail.397 At least one commentator believes it is already too late for
attorneys to successfully react to the MDP movement.398 Yet, one thing seems
certain: the MDP issue is not likely to go away anytime soon. Instead, for the
foreseeable future, it will remain a dominant issue for both the states and the
federal government.399

393. Donald S. Gray, Multidisciplinary Practice (“MDP”) Part II: The Most Important Issue
Facing the Legal Profession Today, 41 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 5, 6 (1999). But see Report,
supra note 3 (noting that “[t]here is . . . no assurance that lawyers will choose to practice in
MDPs or that clients will prefer to purchase legal services from such providers.”).
394. See Bower, Strategic Planning, supra note 385; see also discussion supra Part VI.A.
395. See Gray, supra note 393, at 6.
396. See Editorial, Umbrella’s for Lawyers, et al., PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Aug. 29, 1999, at
K08. “In an increasingly global economy, permitting American lawyers to en-ter [sic] MDPs
here may be inevitable, if only as a pragmatic, defensive maneuver.” Id. But see Levinson,
supra note 50:
The Report appears to assume that a member of an MDP will be more readily available to
the client than would be an independent professional; That services rendered by a member
of an MDP will be at least as competent as those rendered by an independent
professional; That the client will save time and money by one stop shopping.
Id. Moreover, the MDP Comm’n relied on purely speculative testimony to support the
proposition that MDPs are inevitable. Id.
397. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 135; see also Bower, Strategic Planning, supra
note 385 (noting that “in today’s marketplace, a scenario in which the major accounting firms
have taken over the worldwide provision of international corporate legal services is not
implausible.”).
398. See Brown, supra note 325, at 12. Brown notes, “I can think of no economic scenarios
where lawyers maintain their position in the market. The best the profession can hope for is a
level playing field where, in order to compete, lawyers are forced to make major change to their
business structures.” Id.
399. See Myers, supra note 159; Bacon, supra note 96, at 2.
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VIII. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The ABA’s decision to delay voting on MDPs was more than appropriate
due to the threats MDPs pose to clients and the core values of the legal
profession. Although the Commission made an honest attempt to protect the
core values of the legal profession, the obvious problems with the
recommendation and potential consequences of MDPs in general indicate that
clients may be harmed by MDPs.400 Since MDPs are going to change the way
the legal profession operates and the way clients receive legal services, the
rules should not be amended until the ABA, the states, the legal profession,
and consumers have fully analyzed the implications of such a change. 401 July
2000 will clearly be too early for such an analysis to be complete and for the
issue to be decided. But since the United States has never permitted MDPs,
there seems to be no reason why the ABA cannot postpone deciding the issue
until the potential consequences of MDPs have been fully addressed. Until the
ABA feels confident that clients will not be harmed by amendments to the
Model Rules, it needs to abstain from taking a position.
At the same time, regardless of the amount of study conducted on the
issue, one can legitimately question whether the legal profession’s core values
can ever be entirely protected if MDPs are permitted to operate.402
Nonattorney supervisors will inevitably, even if not intentionally, exert their
influence over subordinate attorneys.403 Furthermore, attorneys are bound to
encounter problems maintaining confidentiality even if they comply with all
the necessary safeguards.404 More specifically, an attorney in an MDP may
have no control over nonattorney supervisors who incidentally overhear or
intentionally seek out information that should be held confidential.
Additionally, even if attorneys can convey the meaning and importance of the
legal profession’s ethics rules, accountants are already resisting them and are
not legally bound to follow them.405
The legal profession is in the business of serving clients. Notwithstanding
that focus, the core values of the legal profession should not be abdicated for
the sake of clients’ demands. The main purpose of the legal profession’s
ethics rules is to protect clients by avoiding interferences with attorneys’
independent professional judgment.406 Moreover, the fact that the Big Five
400. See generally discussion supra Parts III.B, V.A, V.C.
401. See generally ABA House of Delegates Calls for Additional Study of Multidisciplinary
Practice, supra note 2 (according to William G. Paul, MDPs are “so important that we need more
time to listen to one another and review what we have learned.”).
402. See generally discussion supra Parts III.B,V.
403. See generally supra notes 197-201 and accompany text; 245-50 and accompanying text.
404. See generally supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text; 251 and accompanying text.
405. See generally supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text; 262 and accompanying text.
406. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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and other professional service firms may already be de facto MDPs is not a
sufficient reason to change the rules. First, even if the ABA amends its rules
to bring the Big Five under legal regulations, the states may choose not to
follow the ABA’s lead, and thus, de facto MDPs will still exist in various
states.407 Moreover, the ABA and the states should at least make an attempt to
enforce disciplinary rules and UPL statutes against firms engaging in unethical
conduct before concluding that MDPs are inevitable. Ultimately, if law firms
or professional service firms are not complying with the rules they are
violating the law and should be reprimanded accordingly.408
Also, insofar as MDPs are going to change the way the legal profession
operates, a tremendous burden is going to be placed on the ABA and the
states. Obviously the rule prohibiting fee sharing is not the only rule or
protection implicated by MDPs. In fact, all of the Model Rules as well as UPL
statutes will be affected by the change since they are all based on protecting
attorneys’ independent professional judgment.409 Thus, in addition to
implementing safeguards through new Model Rules, the Commission and the
ABA must consider and propose amendments to all of the current Model Rules
to ensure that clients are protected.410 Subsequently, the individual states will
have to consider what amendments and additions should be made to their own
professional conduct rules. Moreover, the ABA and the states will then have
to consider which model it ultimately wants to adopt.411 The states may or
may not follow the recommended approach of the ABA. Additional obstacles
and confusion will be created if the amendments made and the models adopted
are not uniform from state to state.412
Since MDPs will pose a tremendous burden on the ABA and the states and
since there is no guarantee MDPs will be capable of preserving the core values
of the legal profession, MDPs should not be permitted to operate in the United
States. This does not mean, however, that the legal profession should do
nothing. Regardless of the side of the debate the legal profession takes
regarding MDPs, the emergence of the issue should be seen as a “wake-up
call” that some type of change is necessary.413
To improve the services provided by the legal profession and guarantee
clients are protected, two discrete courses of action are available. First, the
legal profession can recognize and increase enforcement of existing rules.414
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

See generally supra note 367 and accompanying text.
See supra note 95.
See generally discussion supra Part II.C.
See, e.g., supra note 343 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16-46 and accompanying text, 350-63 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 296.
See Myers, supra note 159; Bacon, supra note 96, at 2.
See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
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If properly enforced, the current rules are capable of protecting clients and the
core values of the legal profession even in the wake of emerging MDPs. At
the same time, the legal profession can focus on how it can compete in a global
market and provide more efficient and effective services.415 As one attorney
notes, “we must begin to teach and practice those skills and qualities that will
allow us to become indispensable advisers to our clients, so that they willingly
turn to us for counsel on their most important problems.”416
In the alternative, the “D.C. Model” may be a viable option for the United
States. This model, which has already been implemented in one jurisdiction in
the United States, requires limited amendments.417 Moreover, since it has not
caused any ethics complaints, it appears to be preserving the core values of the
legal profession.418 Since the “D.C. Model” is limited to providing “solely”
legal services, it does not seem to provide consumers with a single entity that
can solve all of a client’s problems.419 Thus, the “D.C. Model” does not meet
consumers’ demands. Yet, the ability to hire various professionals to work
with an attorney may provide some of the benefits of an MDP.420 At the same
time, however, the “D.C. Model” does not solve the problems created by the
current practices of professional service firms such as the Big Five. These
firms probably will not give up the other services they provide in order to
provide only legal services and thereby be brought within the legal
profession’s ethics rules. Rather, they will continue to operate as they have
been for years. Thus, if this model is implemented, increased enforcement of
legal ethics rules and UPL statutes will still be necessary. Although the “D.C.
Model” is not considered an MDP under the Commission’s definition, it will
not require a fundamental change to the Model Rules and it seems capable of
preserving the core values of the legal profession while providing some of the
benefits of an MDP.421
Both of these options are better suited for the legal profession in the
United States than MDPs under the Commission’s definition. Since neither
option requires a complete overhaul of the current rules, they should at least be
attempted before implementing a practice that will completely change the legal
profession and will potentially harm clients.

415. See supra notes 329-32 and accompanying text.
416. Myers, supra note 159.
417. See generally discussion supra Part II.A.2.
418. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
419. See App. C, supra note 3.
420. See id. (noting that the Model Rules’ defenders believe “that a client can achieve the
benefits of a full-service or one-stop practice by hiring professionals from different disciplines to
work with a lawyer.”).
421. See supra note 46.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Clients may demand MDPs and professional service firms such as the Big
Five may already be taking steps to fulfilling this demand. The legal
profession can certainly allow these factors to dictate its response to the MDP
movement despite the potential consequences MDPs will have on the legal
profession and the general public. In the alternative, the legal profession can
focus on protecting clients by emphasizing its commitment to loyalty,
integrity, and uncompromised representation. Ultimately, the only genuinely
effective way to emphasize and protect the core values that safeguard clients’
interests is to resist the expansion of MDPs.
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